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INTRODUCTION
In June of 1993 in the Khabarovsk region of Russia, authorities
detained Oleg Myachikov, a military serviceman, on suspicion of the rape
and brutal murder of three women.1 The only evidence supporting the
arrest was Myachikov's recollection that he saw the women near a caf6
sometime near the time of their disappearance.2
Once in custody, Myachikov endured hours of questioning,
supplemented by beatings with clubs and sticks.3 Officers threatened that
he would endure more pain unless he gave out information, including the
names of his accomplices.4 Under torture, Myachikov shouted out several
names .
5
Based on this "confession," the authorities arrested two friends of
Myachikov. 6 The authorities told Myachikov that his friends had confessed
to the crime, and that he himself would fare better if he signed a protocol
admitting his guilt.7 Myachikov promised to sign whatever he was given,
but the beatings continued.8 On one occasion, officers hit him in the head
with a bottle of liquor.
9
In the case of Myachikov, the military prosecutor's office
intervened to separate him from the other prisoners. As a result, he
survived the brutal treatment."l Myachikov was the only suspect in that
case to survive pre-trial investigation. One of his alleged "accomplices"
See Moscow CENTER FOR PRISON REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE










10 See id. at 9.
' See id.
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was beaten and left to die in the woods. 12 The other was impaled on a stake
after undergoing unspeakable tortures. 3  Neither had been tried for the
crime.
14
Rather than conducting inquiries regarding the misconduct of its
investigators, the Russian Procuracy, the institution responsible for criminal
investigations, allowed the investigators to engage in an unconscionable
cover-up. One day after abandoning a suspect's broken body in the woods,
two investigators appeared on local television and announced his escape
from detention.15 When Myachikov finally obtained a lawyer and filed a
protest with respect to his own treatment, Procuracy officials said that his
complaint would be sent to the military Procuracy. 16  The military
Procuracy had no authority to supervise the departments of the regular
Procuracy;17 thus, no action was taken.
Witnesses to this actual case in Khabarovsk recounted these horrors
in 1993. Similar atrocities have occurred even more recently. Last year,
the U.S. Department of State criticized the Russian system for coercing
confessions through torture and failing in other respects to protect human
rights in the criminal system. 18  The Russian Constitution prohibits
detention for over forty-eight hours except where authorized by judicial
decision; 19 however, detention that is arbitrary and illegal is widely
practiced.20
Both the Russian Constitution2 and the Russian Criminal Code
prohibit torture.22 From a legal standpoint, Russia has achieved a
democratic system dedicated to protecting the rights of the individual.
Several questions remain: why does the Russian system fall so miserably in






18 See U. S. Department of State, Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1999 Sec. 1 (c) (visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http:llwww.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
1999_hrp reportrussia.html>, [hereinafter 1999 Russia Report]; see also U.S. Department
of State, Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Sec. 1 (c) (last
modified Feb. 26, 1999) <http:/lwww.state.gov/www.globallhuman-rights/l998hrp-report
russia.html> [hereinafter 1998 Russia Report].
19 See KONsT. RE (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 2, art. 22 (1993).
20 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1 (d); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1 (d).
21 See KONST. R (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 2, art. 21 (1993).
22 See CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RussLAN FEDERATION, sec. 7, art. 117, translated in
CRIMINAL CODE OFTHrE RuSSLAN FEDERATION 61 (William E. Butler ed., trans., 3d ed. 1999).
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practice and how does an ostensibly democratic society in the twenty-first
century allow it to fail? Are these conditions, nine years after the change in
government, simply a natural stage of the transition process or are they
avoidable? Are there specific weaknesses in the Russian system that
perpetuate its shocking human rights abuses?
Limited comparative experience suggests that, during an effective
transition from a Communist to a democratic government, society need not
suffer these abuses. Poland, whose Communist government fell only two
years before that of Russia, provides a useful contrast to Russian reform
failures. Undoubtedly, Poland is not free of police brutality. However,
each reported case was either resolved through the criminal justice system
or is still pending.23 Furthermore, the 1999 Department of State Report for
Poland did not report any cases of torture.24 Poland also adheres to its
constitutional prohibition against arbitrary arrest and its requirement of
court authorization for detention for over 48 hours.
Scholars have examined national reform programs and analyzed the
variables that may cause the results of reform to differ widely from one
society to another. Jeffrey Sachs has published a recent essay analyzing the
factors that affect economic success in transition nations.26 Sachs contends
that civil society is a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of a
functional capitalist system.27 He contrasts relative failures in Russia with
comparative successes in Poland and attributes Poland's success to its law-
based state.28 According to Sachs, organized groups, including the
Solidarity trade union and the Roman Catholic Church, raised public
23 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 1999
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Poland, Sec. I (c) (visited Sept. 12, 2000)
<http:lwww.state.gov/www.globallhuman-rights/1999-hrp-report/poland.html>
[hereinafter 1999 Poland Report]; see also U.S. Department of State, Poland Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Sec. 1 (c) (last modified Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www.global/human-rights/1998-hrp-report/poIand.html>
[hereinafter 1998 Poland Report].
24 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 1 (c).
25 See id. at Sec. 1 (d). Article 41 of the Polish Constitution prohibits deprivation of
freedom, except in accordance with principles specified by law. See THE CONSTIrUTON OF
THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, art. 41 (1997), reprinted in CONSTITUIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Release 97-5) (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Inter-University Associates, Inc. trans.,
Oceana Publications, Inc. 1997). In addition, that section requires court authorization for
prolonged detention. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, id., at art. 41.
26 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Globalization and the Rule of Law, YALE L. SCH. OCCASIONAL
PAPERS, 2d ser., n.4 (1998).
27 See id. at 9.
28 See id. at 9.
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awareness. Thus, those groups provided a check on the government and
created an environment in which a law-based state was possible.29
At least one scholar has analyzed nations in transition and proposed
a non-economic theory that complements that of Sachs. Janos Kis argues
that certain factors are necessary for successful transition.30 Among these
factors are the existence, within the population, of "credible" opposition and
popular acceptance of the idea of negotiated reform.3' In addition, high
popular mobilization provides the necessary impetus for the government to
undertake a negotiated reform program.
Poland's comparative success and Russia's relative failure have
been widely noted throughout different sectors of society.33 This paper will
explore whether the factors identified by Sachs and Kis explain the
different outcomes in Polish and Russian criminal procedure reforms in the
transitional period. It will also analyze reforms proposed for the Russian
system in light of Polish achievements. Specifically, this Note will focus
on attempts to shorten pre-trial detention and to eliminate the use of torture
to extract confessions.
Criminal justice reforms in Poland and Russia have focused, at
least in part, on increasing judicial independence. One major problem with
protecting human rights under the former Communist systems was the
dependence of the judiciary on the Communist party. Judicial dependence
under the Soviet regime led to the prevalence of "telephone law," or the
ability of powerful individuals to control judicial decisions simply by
making a phone call.34 This dependence persists into the post-transition
period and prevents courts from applying the human rights protections that
exist in law. 5
Scholars have proposed several solutions to the problem of the
dependent Russian judiciary and the resulting criminal justice abuses. One
proposed solution is the establishment of an effective Ombudsman
29 See id.




33 See generally, Moscow CENTER FOR PRISON REFORM, supra note 1; see generally
1999 Russia Report, supra note 18; 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23; Sachs, supra note
26.
34 See Valery M. Savitsky, Judicial Protection of Personal Rights in Russia, in LEGAL
REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN 117, 120 (Stanislaw
Frankowski & Paul B. Stephan DI eds., 1995).
35 See id.
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(Commissioner for Human Rights) in Russia.36 Another possible solution is
removing criminal trials from the purview of the judiciary by implementing
jury trials throughout Russia.37 Poland has achieved great success in
protecting human rights through its active Ombudsman, a position in
existence since before the end of the Communist period.38 It has not,
however, implemented jury trials.39
This paper will analyze these and other proposed reforms and
evaluate how they may contribute to preventing arbitrary detention and the
use of torture in Russia. It will view these reforms from the perspective of
the Polish experience, in an attempt to gain insight that may aid Russia in
its transition. This paper will also lend support to the complementary Sachs
and Kis theories and may help reformers to understand which strategies
may be more easily transferable from one society to another. This Note
argues that the institution of the Ombudsman is one that might be
successfully transferred to Russia. In addition, it argues that jury trials are
an inappropriate reform in Russia at the present time.
Section I will provide general background on the most important
historical events surrounding the fall of the Communist governments in
Poland and Russia, as well as a brief overview of the structure of the
criminal systems in both Poland and Russia. Section II will outline the
Sachs and Kis framework and provide the perspective from which reforms
will be analyzed.
Section III will evaluate the efficacy of reforms in both Poland and
Russia, focusing on the institution of the Ombudsman and the
implementation of jury trials as important proposals for Russia. It will also
recognize that no reform can operate successfully in isolation. Thus,
Section I will give appropriate treatment to the constitutional tribunals in
each country, as well as the emerging importance of international law
standards in protecting human rights. The goal of Section m is to provide
an integrated analysis of whether and how current reforms work together in
each country to protect human rights in the criminal justice system.
Section IV will move to a comparative focus and reevaluate reform
strategies in light of the Sachs and Kis theories, demonstrating that these
theories aid in predicting the success or failure of reform proposals.
Section IV will draw on the Polish experience to propose solutions to
36 See LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 19 (1995)
[hereinafter PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE].
37 See Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INTL L. REV.
1327, 1343-44 (1998).
38 See Ewa Letowska, The Ombudsman and Basic Human Rights, E. EUR. CONST. REV.,
Winter 1995, at 63, [hereinafter Letowska, Basic Rights].
39 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 1 (e); 1998 Poland Report, supra note
23, at Sec. 1(e).
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Russian reform problems. It will argue that the institution of the
Ombudsman is a reform that should be supported in Russia, while jury
trials are a reform that should be postponed to a more appropriate time.
Finally, Section V will discuss broader implications of the Sachs and Kis
theories and the importance of international law in reforming legal systems.
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
The problems of criminal justice reform are closely linked to the
social currents underlying the introduction of new reforms. This Section
briefly describes the historical and social events leading up to the fall of
Communism in Poland and Russia and the ensuing transitions to democratic
government. In addition, it provides a brief overview of the Polish and
Russian criminal systems and introduces the difficulties those countries
have encountered in implementing criminal justice reform.
A. Historical Foundations
An analysis of social factors contributing to the success and failure
of reforms would be incomplete without a brief discussion of the social
conditions existing in Poland and Russia during the years leading up to the
fall of Communism. This Section provides a general background on
historical and societal events and the influence of opposition movements to
the Communist regime.
1. Polish Solidarity and the Unified Reform Movement
The decade preceding Poland's transition to a democratic, capitalist
system was a turbulent one for the Poles. It began, as in Russia, with a
history grounded in a repressive Communist past. Poland had been under
Soviet dominion since 1944.40 Nearly four decades later, the birth of the
Solidarity movement ushered in the beginning of the decline of the
Communist regime in Poland.
40 See Walter D. Connor & Piotr Ploszajski, Introduction: Background to Crisis, in THE
POLISH ROAD FROM SocIALIsM: THE ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICS OF TRANSION
15, 15 (Walter D. Connor & Piotr Ploszajski eds., 1992).
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The Solidarity movement began as a regional labor revolt, spurred
by discontent with poor working conditions and rising prices.4 ' Shipyard
workers in the northern city of Gdansk (including future President of
Poland Lech Walesa) initiated the primary stage of the movement when
they protested the firing of a crane operator.4 2 In the summer of 1980,
approximately 81,000 people in 177 industries engaged in strikes, pressing
management for wage increases and other concessions.43
The strikes in the north proved so effective that the Communist
authorities were forced to negotiate with the strikers. 44 The Social Accords,
signed in 1980, allowed Solidarity to establish an independent labor
union.45  In making this concession, the Communist government
underestimated the popular appeal of the movement. Following the
Accords, delegations were initiated in Gdansk by strike committees from
across the country.46 The strike leaders determined that, although local
organizations should have considerable autonomy, a unified nationwide
organization could be more effective.47 Thus, a nationwide union, headed
primarily by Walesa, came into being under legal authority.
The Solidarity movement existed legally for over a year, during
which time workers in various plants were able to achieve their goals by
means of strikes and protests.4 However, dissent from various factions
within the movement also increased. Some groups sought more open
confrontation with the Communist government and, throughout 1981,
negotiation between the regime and Solidarity became more difficult.49
In late 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski stepped into power as
Poland's Prime Minister.50 One of his first actions was to impose a
crackdown on Solidarity. All Solidarity leaders who could be found were51
arrested, and martial law descended on Poland. Martial law imposed a
41 See GALE STOKES, THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN: THE COLLAPSE OF
COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 34 (1993).
42 See id. at 35.
43 See MICHAEL D. KENNEDY, PROFESSIONALS, POWER AND SOLIDARITY IN POLAND: A
CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SOVIET-TYPE SOCIETY 51 (1991).
44 See STOKES, supra note 41, at 37.
41 See id. at 38.
46 See id.
47 See id.
41 See id. at 39-40.
49 See id at 40-4 1.
'0 See id. at 42.
5' See id. at 44.
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degree of "order" to Poland52 but did not completely suppress the Solidarity
movement. The Solidarity leaders who escaped went "underground" and
reorganized. 3 Solidarity published a significant amount of underground
literature during the years of martial law, including several widely read
opposition newspapers.54 Incongruously, support for Solidarity continued
and even increased during the martial law period.55
As martial law lifted, the aftermath of public sentiment resulting
from the Solidarity movement compelled Jaruzelski to implement several
reforms.56 In 1986, Jaruzelski granted complete amnesty to all those
detained under the 1982 martial law crackdown.57 Jaruzelski and his
successor, Zbigniew Messner, also implemented several economic reforms
that drove food prices sharply upward.58 In 1988, strikes began again. 9
This time, Solidarity leaders were not the organizers of the protest. 60
The Communist authorities began to realize that they lacked the
strength to control the people. Recognizing the power still held by the
Solidarity movement, the government invited Solidarity to participate in
negotiations with it and several other organizations, including the Catholic
Church and PRON.
61
These negotiations became the Roundtable Talks of 1989.62 Out of
the talks came an economic plan, an independent judiciary, freedom of
association and numerous constitutional innovations.63  The new
constitutional provisions provided for a transition to free elections for the
Senate and the Sejm (Polish Parliament). The first elections, held only two
months after the Roundtable Talks, finally ushered out the Communist
regime. Solidarity candidates won all of the contested Sejm seats and all
52 See Miroslawa Marody, The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of
Systemic Transitions, in THE POLISH ROAD FROM SOCIALIsM: THE ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY,
AND POLMCS OFTRANSMON 255, 256 (Walter D. Connor & Piotr Ploszajski eds., 1992).
53 See STOKES, supra note 41, at 105-06.
54 See id. at 106-07.
55 See id. at 108.
56 For example, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), created by
Jaruzelski, was to "reflect a 'pluralism of views and the differentiation of interests."' Id. at
110.
51 See id. at 115.
" See id. at 121.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 125; see also supra note 56 (defining PRON as the Patriotic Movement for
National Rebirth).
62 See id. at 124-25.
63 See id. at 125-26.
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but one Senate seat.64 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a former Catholic dissident,
was elected as the new Prime Minister.65 Poland had begun to leave its
Communist days behind.
Solidarity began as a moral rather than a political movement.
66
Although it primarily focused on labor concerns, Solidarity later developed
a nationalist element (to which the Roman Catholic Church contributed a
strong sense of identity) and a democratic element.67 Since Solidarity did
embody all of these components, it moved from its original concern with
self-organization to broader economic, and finally political, goals.68
The Catholic Church was a key player in adding credibility to the
Solidarity movement. The Polish Pope John Paul II may have played a role
in bringing the opposition movement to life and later linking the opposition
with the Church. During the Pope's 1979 visit, he called for law, justice
and respect for the dignity of human beings.69 He imputed responsibility• • 70
for Poland's decline to members of the Communist regime. The Pope's
words connected the Catholic Church with Polish identity and inspired the
religious Poles to action.71
Over the ten years preceding the fall of the Communist
government, Solidarity assumed the interests not only of its original leaders
but of many different sectors of Polish society. Thus, Solidarity was from
the beginning more than a labor movement. It represented the Polish nation
itself. Solidarity became a functional alliance between different interest
groups72 and the principal "counter-culture" in opposition to the regime.
73
These diverse groups were united only by their common dislike of the
Communist Party.74 Throughout the 1980s, Polish citizens came to view
Solidarity as a unified opposition movement to the Communist regime75
64 See id. at 127.
65 See id. at 127-28.
66 See id. at 39.
67 See KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 64-65.
68 See id. at 86.
69 See id. at 43.
70 See id. (blaming "evil prophets" and years of "falsehood" for Poland's decline).
71 See id. at 44.
72 See id. at 4-5.
73 See id. at 7.
74 See Krzystof Jasiewicz, Polish Elections of 1990: Beyond the "Pospolite Ruszenie," in
THE POLISH ROAD FROM SOCIALISM: THE ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY, AND POLITICS OF
TRANSITION 181, 185 (Walter D. Connor & Piotr Ploszajski eds., 1992).
75 See Jack Bielasiak, The Dilemma of Political Interests in the Postcommunist
Transition, in THE POLISH ROAD FROM SOCIALISM: THE ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY, AND
POLITICS OF TRANSITION 199, 204 (Walter D. Connor & Piotr Ploszajski eds., 1992).
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and they understood the societal conflict as one between Solidarity and
Communism. 76 In 1989, the Polish population made its choice between the
two alternatives and ended the Communist regime.
2. Russian Dissidents: "Voices Crying in the Wilderness"
Russia's transition from Communism to a democratic society took a
very different course from the Polish experience. There was no mass social
movement in Russia comparable to Solidarity. The opposition to the
Russian Communist regime was disunified and isolated. Thus, when
change came, it occurred from within the regime itself.
Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Russian Communist
regime, came to power in 1985." Gorbachev was more liberal than his
predecessors and sought to introduce revolutionary olicy reforms. These
included the concepts of "glasnost," or "openness," and "perestroika," or
reconstruction of the Communist regime.79- Such concepts were essentially
capitalistic and democratic reforms. Gorbachev believed that, once the
Communist regime was revitalized by these reforms, it would triumph in
Europe. 0
Despite Gorbachev's aspirations, the reforms of the 1980s shook
the foundations of the Russian regime.81 Once Gorbachev had relaxed the
central controls of the Soviet Union, the nation became unstable. 2 An
economic crisis turned the population against Gorbachev, and support
shifted to Gorbachev's rivals in the Communist regime, such as Boris
Yeltsin. 3 In order to control the population, Gorbachev was forced to
begin a program of cooperation with Yeltsin.84
In August 1991, while Gorbachev vacationed with his family in
Crimea, several officers from the KGB and the Interior Ministry staged a
coup in Moscow.85 Yeltsin, still in Moscow, defended the Supreme Soviet
building and defeated the rebels.86 When Gorbachev returned, Yeltsin had
76 See id. at 201.
77 See ROBERT SERVICE, A HISTORY OFTWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIA 435 (1998).
78 Among other consequences of glasnost was a relaxation of censorship within Russian
society. See id. at 448-49.
79 See id. at 441.
so See id at 443.
81 See id. at 466.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 494-95.
84 See id. at 494.
85 See id. at 499.
86 See id. at 500-01.
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effective control of the government.87 Gorbachev resigned officially in late
1991.88
The Communist regime had been severely weakened by the events
of the Gorbachev years. With Gorbachev's resignation, the Soviet Union
disintegrated and gave way to numerous independent republics.89 Yeltsin
reorganized the remaining republics into a state now known as the Russian
Federation and swiftly introduced market reforms.90 Russia had embarked
upon what would become not only an economic, but a political transition as
well.
The primary difference between the Polish transition and its
Russian counterpart is that Russian reform did not come from an opposition
group. Such groups did exist in Russia, even prior to the Gorbachev era;
however, the persecution those groups suffered under the repressive regime
kept them from uniting or gaining much influence within society as a
whole.
In the 1970s, well-known dissidents, such as Andrei Sakharov,
were imprisoned or exiled.91  Groups such as the refuseniks 92 and
nationalist organizations also existed in the republics during that period.93
The problem was that there was no unifying force in Russia comparable to
the Solidarity movement in Poland. Moscow-based opposition groups had
only limited contact with refuseniks in the capital, and they had virtually no
contact with opposition groups in the republics.94 In addition, interest
groups were not able to ignore old rivalries of ideology, region and class.95
Thus, the spread of opposition ideas was limited and no unified opposition
emerged.96
Because the dissident groups of the USSR failed to unite, their
influence was short-lived. By the post-transition period of the 1990s, the
former dissenters remaining in Russia had become marginalized.97 The few
who still survived in the Yeltsin era, including Andrei Sakharov's widow
87 See id. at 501-02.
88 See id. at 507.
89 See id.
90 See id. at511.
9' See id. at 412.
92 "Refuseniks" were Russians who were refused permission to emigrate on the grounds
that they had had access to important state information. Two-hundred and fifty thousand
refuseniks left the USSR during Brezhnev's rule. See id. at 400.
9' See id. at 414.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 476.
96 See id. at 414-15.
97 See id. at 541.
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Yelena Bonner, were isolated from the rest of society. Although those
individuals were still staunch advocates of human rights and democracy,
they were but "voices crying in the wilderness."98 Russia thus entered its
transition period devoid of any strong, unified opposition movement.
B. Overview of the Polish and Russian Criminal Systems
This Section provides a brief overview of the current structure of
the Polish and Russian systems and how well they have protected human
rights. It outlines the successes and failures of each country's criminal
procedure system in the years since the fall of Communism.
1. Polish Criminal System
Under Polish criminal law, defendants are presumed innocent until
proven guilty.99 The prosecutor thus has the legal burden of proof.00
Defendants also have the right to counsel at all stages of criminal
proceedings. 10 If a defendant cannot afford to hire an attorney, one must
be provided at public expense.
0 2
It is usually the function of the police to investigate offenses,
although the public prosecutor may investigate serious offenses. 03 At this
time it is the courts, rather than the public prosecutors, that issue arrest
warrants." 4 In order to detain a defendant, the police must have "sufficient
evidence that can demonstrate the suspects' [sic] involvement in an
" Id. at 521.
99 See THE CONSTIrUrION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 42(3). "An
accused is presumed innocent as long as his fault has not been demonstrated and ascertained
through a legally valid pronouncement by a judge." KODEKS POSTEPOWANIA KARNEGO
[CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 5, § 1 (Pol.) (author's translation). The Polish Criminal
Code also requires guilt to find that an offense has been committed. "The perpetrator of an
illicit act does not commit an offen[s]e if guilt cannot be attributed to him at the time of the
commission of the act." KODEKS KARNY (CRIMINAL CODE) art. 1, § 3 (Pol.) (unofficial
translation by Polish Ministry of Justice, on file with author).
1(o See Andrzej Adamski, Criminal Justice Profile of Poland (visited Sept. 29, 1999)
<http:/wvwv.law.uni.torun.pl.publikacjelaadamskilraport>, at See. V(1).
101 See THE CONSTrUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 42(2). The
Criminal Procedure Code also provides this right. "To the accused belongs the right to a
defense, and with this the right to assistance in his defense, of which he must be informed."
KODEKS POsTEPOwANIA KARNEGO [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (author's translation).
102 See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, Id. at art. 42(2); see also 1999
Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. l(e).
103 See Adamski, supra note 100, at Sec. V(2).
104 See id. at Sec. V(3).
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offense."' 105 Detention is appropriate where there is good reason to fear a
defendant would: (1) flee; (2) obstruct the criminal proceedings or induce
others to give false evidence; (3) commit another "felony or misdemeanor
against life, health or public safety.' 0 6 In addition, it may be appropriate if
the accused has been charged with a felony punishable by eight years or
more in prison or convicted by a trial court and sentenced to three years or
more.10 7 Bail is available as an alternative to pretrial detention, and may be
granted by the courts or the prosecutor. 10 8 Most defendants are released on
bail pending trial. 109
Detention must be ordered by the Supreme Court.110 Under no
circumstances may it last more than eighteen months until the trial court's
judgment, or two years in the case of a felony offense.'"
After preparation, a case proceeds to trial, which is generally
public. 12 Cases are tried before a panel including a judge and two lay
magistrates, who participate on an equal footing with the judge in passing a
decision." 3 A defendant's confession may be considered as evidence but is
alone insufficient to prove guilt. 14 In addition, the defendant may not be
interrogated under oath. 1 15  The prosecution and defense do not make
separate evidentiary presentations; instead, the judge plays an active role in
examining evidence. 16 If found guilty, a defendant may appeal errors of






109 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 1(d); 1998 Poland Report, supra note
23, at Sec. 1(d).
110 See Adamski, supra note 100, at Sec. V(3).
'11 See id.
112 The Polish Constitution provides for the right to a "fair and public hearing" of one's
case. THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 45(1).
113 See Adamski, supra note 100, at Sec. V(1). The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure
provides for a panel of one judge and two laypersons. "At trial, the head judge adjudicates
in a panel of one judge and two laypersons, if a law does not provide otherwise." KODEKS
POSTEPOWANIA KARNEGO [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 28, § 1 (Pol.) (author's
translation).
114 See Adamski, supra note 100, at Sec. V(1).
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 The Polish Constitution grants every party the right to appeal from a judgment of the
court of first instance. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25,
at art. 78.
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The defendant's punishment may not be increased as a result of his own
appeal.
118
The Polish court system consists of four levels: (1) the courts of
first instance; (2) district courts; (3) courts of appeal; and (4) the Supreme
Court in Warsaw.1 9 Judges are nominated by the National Council of
Judiciary and appointed by the President for life terms.
120
Poland, for the most part, adheres to legal restrictions on the power
of investigators and judges, as well as constitutional provisions that protect
the human rights of defendants. 121 However, the U.S. State Department has
noted several instances of police brutality in the past year. 22 In all of these
instances, charges were filed and the incidents were resolved through the
court system. 123- The Department of State also criticized Poland for its poor
prison conditions, perpetuated by a drastic lack of funding. 24
Perhaps the most serious problem for Poland is its underfunded
court system. The system is still slow and inefficient, and there are few
effective mechanisms for enforcing civil judgments.125 The United Nations
Committee on Human Rights noted that these inefficiencies violated a
defendant's right to a speedy public trial and harshly criticized Poland for
the delays. 26 It stated that one year was too long a wait for trial and urged
Poland to make progress before the next report. 127 It praised, however, the
118 See Adamski, supra note 100, at Sec. VI(1).
119 See id.
120 See THE CoNsTrrION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 179 (1997).
See also Adamski, supra note 100, at Sec. VI(3). Judges are removable from office only for
reasons specified in the Polish Constitution. See id. at art. 180.
121 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23; 1998 Poland Report, supra note 23. In
addition to the protections for criminal defendants noted above, Poland's constitutional
provisions generally protect the rights and dignity of persons. See THE CONSTITUTON OF
THE REPUBLIC OFPOLAND, supra note 25, at art. 5. 1997); Id. at art. 30.
122 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 1(c); 1998 Poland Report, supra note
23, at Sec. 1(c).
123 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 1(c).
124 See id.
125 See id. at Sec. l(e). The former Polish Ombudsman, Adam Zielinski, also criticized
the inefficiency of the system and stated that the slow system created problems in protecting
the rights of Polish citizens. See Ombudsman: Poland still not a Law-Abiding State, POLISH
PRESS AGENCY, May 9, 2000, available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Poland News
File.
126 See Human Rights Reform by 2003, Polish News Bull, Aug. 5, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Poland News Files.
127 See id.
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constitutional protection of human rights and the enactment of a new 1997
penal code. 128
2. Russian Criminal System
In Russia, punishment without trial and conviction is legally
forbidden. 1 9 Torture and other cruel treatment are prohibited as well. 1
Each defendant has the right to request counsel from the first moment
detained and to have appointed counsel if he cannot afford to pay.
131
Nonetheless, the extreme lack of funds often keeps defendants from
exercising this right in practice.132
The Constitution also prohibits arrest without a judicial decision or
detention for over forty-eight hours without access to a lawyer.13 3 A 1994
bill passed by President Yeltsin to combat organized crime seriously
compromised those rights by extending the allowable detention period
before the formal filing of charges to thirty days.134 A 1997 decree
decreased the period to ten days. 135
128 See id.; see also KODEKS KARNY (CRIMINAL CODE) (Pol.) (unofficial translation by
Polish Ministry of Justice, on file with author).
129 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 2, art. 47 (1993);
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch. 1, art. 13 (1960), translated in THE
SOvIr CODES OF Law 166 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler
trans., 1980); see also FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RUSSIA: A
COUNTRY STUDY 422 [hereinafter RUSSIA STUDY]. The 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure is
still in effect in Russia and, although it has been modified by amendments, the basic
provisions on arrest and detention remain unmodified. See also Todd Foglesong, Habeas
Corpus or Who Has the Body? Judicial Review of Arrest and Pretrial Detention in Russia,
14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 541, 552-553 (1996).
130 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1, ch. 2, art. 21 (1993);
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, art. 114-17 (1996), translated in CRIMINAL
CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 60-61 (William E. Butler ed., trans., 3d ed. 1999). See
also RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129.
131 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 2, art. 48 (1993);
see also RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 422.
132 Some lawyers in Russia attempt to avoid work as appointed counsel, because the
Russian government often fails in its obligation to compensate appointed counsel. See 1999
Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(d).
133 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) See. 1., ch. 2, art. 22 (1993);
see also RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 422.
134 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. l(d); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1 (d).
135 See Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(d).
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The Procuracy is a large, centralized agency responsible for
investigating and prosecuting crimes.' 36  Under the traditional Soviet
system, the Procuracy had the authority to oversee both criminal
investigations and judicial conduct.137 Today, the Procuracy retains the
power to commence an investigation and arrest an individual on suspicion
of a crime.
138
The Russian Criminal Procedure Code sets a two-month time limit
on the period between the opening of the investigation and the time that a
file is transferred to the Procurator to initiate formal court charges. 139 The
Procurator General may extend this period to six months, or to eighteen
months in "exceptional" cases.14° Often, when an extension is granted, no
explanation is made to the detainee.14 1 In addition, the time limits are
frequently violated, sometimes for the purpose of extorting money from the
detainee's friends or relatives. 142 Bail is very infrequently used in Russia,
even where a suspect poses no risk of flight or violence.143 The large
number of pretrial detainees contributes to the already severe overcrowding
problem in Russian prisons) 44
Trials are public in most cases. 145 Jury trials were reintroduced in
Russia in 1995, but to date have only been implemented in nine regions. a46
136 See THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch. 1, art. 3 (1960), translated
in THE SoviEr CODES OF Law 162 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W.
Spindler trans., 1980); see also id. at 582.
137 See RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 582; cf. THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF
THE RSFSR, ch. 18, art. 211 (1960), translated in THE SovIEr CODES OF LAW 237-238
(William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1980).
138 See RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 582, 586; THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OF Tim RSFSR, ch. 18, art. 211 (1960), translated in THE SOvIET CODES OF LAW 237-238
(William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1980).
139 See THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch. 10, art. 133 (1960),
translated in THE SOvIET CODES OF LAW 208 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman &
James W. Spindler trans., 1980); see also 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(d).
140 See THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch. 10, art. 133 (1960),
translated in THE SOvIET CODES OF LAW 208 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman &
James W. Spindler trans., 1980); see also 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(d).
141 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. l(d); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. l(d).
142 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. l(d).
143 See id.
'44 See id.
145 This right is guaranteed to defendants by the Russian Constitution and the Russian
Code of Criminal Procedure. See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 7.,
ch. 7, art. 123 (1993); THE CODE OF CRnvINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch. 1, art. 18,
translated in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 166 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman &
James W. Spindler trans., 1980). See also RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 586.
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In the other eighty regions, cases are tried before a judge or panel of
judges. 147  The judge plays an active role in examining the evidence;
however, the proceedings are often heavily weighted in favor of the
Procurator. 4 8 If, as occurs in 60% of cases, the Procurator does not appear,
the judge plays both roles, interrogating the suspect as well as making the
final determination of guilt.
149
The trial stage is subject to frequent delays, and some suspects
spend as much time in pretrial detention as they would if found guilty of the
crime charged. 150 This is, in part, due to the Procuracy's tendency to delay
in submitting necessary paperwork to the court. One study found that in
only one-third of cases did the Procuracy submit materials within statutory
time limits.15' Still, judges are reluctant to dismiss cases on the grounds of
improper investigation or indictment and more often send cases back to the
Procuracy for reinvestigation.
52
Criminal courts in Russia have three levels: (1) primary jurisdiction
courts; (2) courts of appeals; and (3) higher courts.1 53 A defendant who is
convicted may appeal his sentence;15 4 however, a lower court decision may
146 See RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 587.
147 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at See. 1(e); Russia Report, supra note 18, at
Sec. l(e).
148 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(e).
149 Mumin Shakirov, Judge is Accuser, Arbiter, TE Moscow TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at
Sec. 1426, available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Russia News File.
150 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. I(d); see 1998 Russia Report, supra
note 18, at Sec. 1(d).
151 See Foglesong, supra note 129, at 560.
152 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. I(d); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. I(d). The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the court to refer a case for
supplementary investigation. See THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch.
21, art. 258 (1960), translated in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 254 (William B. Simons ed.,
Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1980). There is no limit on the number of
times a case can be referred for reinvestigation. See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at
Sec. 1(c).
153 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(e); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1(e).
154 The Russian Constitution guarantees the right to appeal both to internal courts and to
international bodies, where applicable. See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian
Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 2, art. 46 (1993); see also RUSSIA STUDY, supra note 129, at 422.
The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides for appeal. See THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, ch. 27, art. 325 (1960), translated in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW
276 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1980).
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be appealed only to the next level unless a constitutional issue is
involved."'
Overall, most scholars acknowledge that Russia has serious
difficulties protecting the human rights of defendants in its criminal justice
system. Among the more severe problems are arbitrary arrest and detention
of suspects. In short, factors such as the pressure on police to solve crimes
and the dependence of the judiciary on the powerful Procuracy mean that
"there are great incentives.. .to arrest and detain suspects.. .and few
obstacles to doing so.',156 Police often detain individuals without following
mandated procedures.1 57 Although a 1992 law gives defendants the right to
have a court review a complaint against an arrest or detention,158 judges
have rarely used this provision to allow the release of a defendant. 59 In
several of the few cases where defendants have been released, police have
immediately rearrested the defendants. 60
As has been suggested, a central problem of the judiciary is its
continued dependence on other branches of government, including the
Procuracy. Russia has implemented piecemeal reforms to address the
problem; for example, it is in the process of granting lifetime appointments
to judges.' 61  These changes have increased the independence of the
judiciary and represent a significant step in the reform process. 162 Most of
Russia's judges, however, have retained their positions from the former
Soviet system 163 and are thus accustomed to dependence on the Party. In
addition, the budgets of all Russian courts except the Supreme Court are
controlled by executive agencies, which increases the dependence of courts
on these agencies. 64 Russian courts, due to underfunding, are often unable
even to pay their own electricity bills without local government aid. 165
Under the Russian Constitution, the judiciary is to receive its funding only
155 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(e); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1(e).
156 Foglesong, supra note 129, at 549.
157 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at See. l(e); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1(c).
158 See Foglesong, supra note 129, at 559.
159 See id. at 542.
'60 See id. at 563.
161 See Boylan, supra note 37, at 1332.
162 See id. at 1329.
163 See id. at 1333.
164 See id. at 1334.
165 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. l(e); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. l(e).
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from the federal government. 166 The judiciary's critical shortage of funds,
however, obviously makes it even more susceptible to outside influence.
The U.S. Department of State criticized Russia for its frequent use
of torture to extract confessions.167 Oleg Mironov, the Human Rights
Ombudsman, estimated that approximately 50% of detainees were tortured
in 1999.168 In some cases, torture was even used to force testimony from
witnesses who might have no knowledge of the case.169  In court,
defendants frequently recant confessions made under coercion; however,
such a confession may still be considered in a decision to convict the
defendant. 170 The State Department also noted that deplorable prison
conditions frequently cause death in Russia.
17 1
In sum, the Russian criminal justice system does not protect human
rights as effectively as does its counterpart in Poland. Section III will
address proposed reforms in both countries and the impact they have had in
alleviating systemic problems. Prior to this analysis, Section II will provide
a framework for evaluating the potential success and failure of reforms in
transition nations.
II. THE SACHS AND KIS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF
REFORM
Much of the literature proposing reforms for countries in transition
focuses on legal and structural reform. Two scholars have used a broader
perspective and have identified societal factors that may affect the relative
success or failure of a transition. Jeffrey Sachs examines economic
transition from Communism to capitalism. In contrast to this economic
166 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 7, art. 124 (1993);
see also 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1 (e).
167 See generally 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(c); 1998 Russia Report,
supra note 18, at Sec. 1(c). The incidence of the use of torture to extract confessions in
Russia may also be related to the prolonged detention periods. Cf. Hiram E. Chodosh &
Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Legal Study: Consensus and Assessment of the New
Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 375, 392 (1997) (arguing that a state's ability
to detain defendants operates as an additional measure of coercion to compel confessions).
168 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(c).
169 See id.; 1998 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(c). Such practices appear to
violate provisions of the Russian Criminal Code, which prohibits the compulsion of
witnesses to give testimony. See CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RusSIAN FEDERATION, Art. 302,
translated in CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 173 (William E. Butler ed.,
trans., 3d ed. 1999).
170 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(e); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. l(e).
171 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 1(c).
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focus, Janos Kis explores political transition from Communism to
democracy. These theories are complementary; both offer societal
explanations for the success or failure of legal reforms.
A. Sachs' Self-Limiting State
Jeffrey Sachs' 1998 essay provides an economic analysis of factors
that support or undermine a country's success in a transition to capitalism.
The traditional theory of capitalism, Sachs argues, is a paradox, since it
requires a state that is both strong and self-limiting.172 In most countries of
the developing world, the paradox remains unsolved, because the state has
not developed the strength to meet even basic needs (including the need for
self-limitation). 173 Russia's situation may be even more disastrous, since its
state is neither strong nor self-limiting.174 In fact, the weakness of the state
has perpetuated its tendency to prey on its citizens.1 75 Sachs thus suggests a
close relationship between the strength of a state and its ability to limit
itself. In Sachs' view, poverty and bad government tend to reinforce each
other and create a cycle that prevents capitalism from taking hold. 1
76
The countries that have been successful in completing the
economic transition are those that have had, from the start, an essentially
law-bound state. Organized groups in society form the base that supports
the self-limiting state. 77  Only at this point is the society receptive to
market reforms. 7 8 In addition to Poland, several other post-Soviet states,
such as Hungary and Bulgaria, have been successful in achieving the rule of
law.1
79
Sachs lists the Roman Catholic Church, the Solidarity movement
and various peasant movements as sources of discipline on the new Polish
government. 18 These groups forced the creation of a self-limited state, in
which a market economy could flourish.' 81 Even groups that opposed
capitalist reform often naturally ushered it in by placing a check on the
172 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 6. The concept of a self-limiting state suggests that the
judiciary will play a major role in overseeing government action.
173 See id. at 8-9.
'74 See id. at 8.
115 See id. at 9.
176 See id. at 7.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See Kis, supra note 30, at 307.
1SO See Sachs, supra note 26, at 9; see also discussion supra Section I.A.1.
11 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 9.
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power of the state.1 82 On the other hand, by the time Communism collapsed
in Russia, the long tradition of authoritarian rule (under czarism and later
the restrictive Communist regime) had crushed the groups that might have
performed this function.
183
B. Kis' Theory of Coordinated Transition
Janos Kis analyzes the problem from a non-economic standpoint.
His theory identifies factors that promote peaceful reform instead of
revolution in certain societies. Kis states that dramatic changes took place
in Europe in a short period of time, but that these changes were somewhat
short of revolution. 184 Kis uses the term "refolution" to encompass the path
between reform and revolution that these nations followed' 85 and later
adopts the phrase "coordinated transition" for clarity.'86
In Kis' view, both reform and revolution occur in a situation where
the government's legitimacy is threatened (what he calls a "legitimation
crisis"). 187  Reform preserves the continuity of the government, while
revolution subverts it.188 In a reform process, the government is still the
dominant power, while in a revolution, the opposition is dominant.'
89
When a government follows the middle path of coordinated
transition, however, the ruling class is divided over the legitimacy of the
current regime. 90 In this situation, neither the regime nor the opposition is
strong enough to avoid cooperation with the other.191 An agreement
between the two regimes provides a transition scenario. 92 Revolutions and
transitions both interrupt continuity. 93 A transition implements dramatic
changes but preserves legitimacy by paradoxically allowing society to view
182 See id.
183 See id. Although opposition groups did exist in Russia, the persecution they suffered
at the hands of the repressive government was one of the factors that prevented those groups
from uniting. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
184 See Kis, supra note 30, at 300-01.
.8. Id. at 301.
186 Id. at 304.
187 Id. at 316-17.
188 See id. at 317.
189 See id.
190 See id. at 356.
191 See id. at 358.
192 See id. at 319.
193 See id. at 325.
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both regimes as legitimate.194 Unlike revolutions, transitions are completed
through accommodation and compromise.
195
Kis draws on experience during the Hungarian transition to reach
his conclusions. Through his analysis of the Hungarian process, he
develops a set of six factors necessary for the middle path of coordinated
transition to succeed. First, Kis argues, the dominant coalition must be split
over the issue of legitimacy. 96 The split creates the conditions that force
cooperation between opposing sides, since each side lacks sufficient power
to block the other side's alternative.
197
Second, both the options of reform and revolution must appear to
both sides to be unreasonably risky. 98 This occurs when the state lacks
power either to put down the opposition by force or to implement
enforceable reforms through the legal process.1 9 Similarly, the opposition
is too weak to overthrow the current regime by force.
20
Third, the opposition to the current regime must be credible-that
is, it must be organized and command a certain authority within the
society.201 Again, the opposition groups, even if credible, must still see
cooperation as a valid alternative to revolution.20 2
Fourth, popular mobilization must be high.203 However, high
popular sentiment also increases the danger of radical breakaway groups
that sweep away both bargaining powers and destroy their incentives to
negotiate. Popular mobilization, therefore, must be too high for the
current regime to control alone but not strong enough to resist the combined
force of the current regime and the opposition.205
Fifth, there must be sufficient agreement on proposals for the
transition period and the future that the current regime and the opposition
206can quickly reach a compromise. °6 A certain level of agreement is also
194 See id. at 314.
195 See id. at 319.
196 See id. at 356.
7 See id. at 358.
198 See id. at 370-71.
'99 See id. at 358-59.
20 See id.
201 See id. at 359-60.
202 See id. at 360.
203 See id. at 361-62.
204 See id. at 362.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 371.
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necessary to ensure the parties' ability to adhere to the agreement after
consensus is reached.20 7
Finally, the idea of the pacted transition, or a transition achieved
through negotiation between the legitimate government and the opposition,
must exist in public political culture.20 8 If the concept of an agreement can
be borrowed and need not be invented, the chances of a transition's taking
hold are greater.209 The existence of the idea decreases the necessity of
political maneuvers and increases the chance that a pact can be completed
within a narrow window of opportunity.210
C. The Integrated Framework
Close examination of Sachs' and Kis' theories reveals a common
framework. Kis argues that where there is a split in legitimacy between a
current regime and strong, credible opposition, there is a chance for a
successful coordinated transition. He also notes that there must be
sufficient consensus to allow an agreement to be reached. Kis' other two
factors deal with the popular consciousness. It is these two factors that lend
the strongest support to Sachs' theory. Kis states that high, yet moderated
popular sentiment is necessary to compel the old regime to change. He
notes also that the idea of transition will be difficult to invent if the concept
does not exist in political culture. These observations support Sachs'
assessment of the Polish transition.
Sachs argues that opposition groups provided a "check" on the
Polish government in the years after the transition. This identifies the role
of the opposition not only in negotiating a compromise at the beginning of
the transition period but also in raising popular consciousness so that
government failure to adhere to the agreement was impossible.21'
Furthermore, the fact that these groups remained in existence throughout
the Communist period meant that the idea of transition was alive in the
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See id. at 366-67.
210 See id. at 367.
211 Of course, the Polish government was also incapable in 1988 of controlling the
population or of putting down the opposition. "[A] repetition of the scenario of martial law,
which had already failed once, was unthinkable as a reaction to the reviving capacity of the
society to act." Krzysztof Nowak, Public Opinion, Values and Economic Reform, in THE
POLISH ROAD FROM SocIALISM: THE ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY AND POLmCS OF TRANSITION
127, 142 (Walter D. Connor & Piotr Ploszajski eds., 1992). It was this inability to act that
forced the government to negotiate with Solidarity during the Roundtable Talks of 1989.
See discussion supra Section I.Al. This scenario conforms to Kis' discussion of coordinated
transition. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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Polish political consciousness. In Russia, on the other hand, years of
authoritarian rule had eliminated not only the opposition groups but also the
idea of peaceful political transition.212 Russia, therefore, had to attempt to
invent the concept in order to begin its transition period.
These complementary theories provide a basic analytical structure
from which to view the societal factors affecting institutional reform.
Section IV will return to examine proposed reforms in light of this
framework, in an attempt to determine which Polish reforms might be more
easily transferred to the different social culture of Russia. Section III will
first analyze each country's experience with past and proposed reforms.
I. EVALUATION OF REFORM STRATEGES
Regardless of social and cultural differences,1 3 Poland and Russia
are two nations that once shared a common form of government. They
entered the transition period also sharing the same problems in human
rights protection.214 As a result, Poland and Russia have implemented
similar reforms. However, as demonstrated above, the results in the two
systems contrast sharply. This contrast raises an important question: do
societal factors allow a reform to be transferred from one society to
another? Section III explores alternative answers to this issue.
This Section will give in-depth treatment to two reforms: the
establishment of the office of Ombudsman and the introduction of jury
trials in Russia. It also will briefly discuss supporting factors in the reform
environment, including the role of the Constitutional Court and
international law standards in each country.
212 Again, although groups such as the refuseniks existed, these groups did not unite and
their ideas did not diffuse throughout the USSR. See discussion supra Section I.A.2. The
Russian government never needed to cooperate with these groups, and Russia had no living
memory of such cooperation.
213 In the context of this Note, the relevant differences are those stemming from the
divergent transition paths taken by Poland and Russia in 1989-1991. See discussion supra
Section I.A.1-2.
214 Cf. Andrzej Wasek & Stanislaw Frankowski, Polish Criminal Law and Procedure, in
LEGAL REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST EuRoPE: THE ViEw FROM WITIRN 275, 301-302
(Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephan III eds., 1995) (discussing the excessive use of
short-term police detention in Poland to harass party opposition).
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A. Poland
1. The Office of the Ombudsman
Since 1988, Poland has had an active Ombudsman (Commissioner
of Human Rights), an independent overseer of human rights violations in
the country.2 1  Polish legislation established the position a year before
Poland's independence, during a period of Communist concession to
opposition groups. 216 The office of the Ombudsman was modeled after the
Scandinavian version and promoted by Polish scholars as a civil rights
protection measure.217 The introduction of the Ombudsman, as well as
several other institutions such as the Constitutional Tribunal, was a
credibility maneuver by the Communist government, intended to improve
the crumbling image of the regime.218 Ewa Letowska, professor at the
Institute of Legal Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, was the first
Polish Ombudsman. 1 9
The Polish Ombudsman has extensive jurisdiction to oversee the
protection of human rights.220 He investigates the actions of administrative
bodies, organizations and institutions. 221 He may also inspect the scope of
operation of these institutions to determine compliance. 222  The
Ombudsman is independent, 2 3 reporting only to Parliament; 224 however,
the Ombudsman's four-year terms do not coincide with those of
Parliament.225 He enjoys immunity from legal process226 and cannot accept
215 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 4; 1998 Poland Report, supra note 23,
at Sec. 1(c).
216 See Zbigniew Holda, Polish Corrections Law, supra note 214, at 351, 356. The
introduction of the Ombudsman reform coincided with additional reforms implemented by
Jaruzelski as a concession to the population. See discussion supra Section I.A. 1. Today, the
Polish Constitution provides for the position of the Ombudsman (Commissioner for Citizens'
Rights). See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 208.
217 See Letowska, Basic Rights, supra note 38, at 63.
218 See id.
219 See Holda, supra note 216, at 356. Although the first Polish Ombudsman was female,
all subsequent Ombudsmen have been male. For this reason, the male pronoun is used
throughout this section.
220 See Ewa Letowska, The Polish Ombudsman (The Commissioner for the Protection of




223 See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 210; see
also Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220.
224 See id. at art. 210.
225 See Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220.
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other employment or hold another position while acting as the
Ombudsman.2
7
The Ombudsman may act either on the petition of an individual or
sua sponte228 In responding to a complaint, he normally addresses himself
to the authority against which the complaint is directed and expresses
disapproval.229 When this action is unsuccessful, the Ombudsman has
power to call upon a higher level of authority, request institution of civil,
criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings, enter extraordinary
appeals against court judgments, or apply to the Constitutional Tribunal to
control the constitutionality of legislation.230 Recent amendments to the
Ombudsman Act have broadened the Ombudsman's basic powers.
Although the Ombudsman has always had the right to investigate cases
involving human rights violations, he now may examine facilities such as
penitentiaries and psychiatric units without prior notification to those
institutions.23' In addition, the Ombudsman may review files of prosecutors
and courts, even where decisions already have been issued.232
Overall, the function of the Ombudsman is that of a "watchdog"
since he may "bark.. .but he may not bite. '233 In other words, he may
criticize authorities and state agencies and bring actions before the
Tribunal, but he may not independently take action to remedy abuses. In
addition, due to limited resources, the Ombudsman is forced to concentrate
on systemic and general problems; he cannot address injustices in each
individual case.2-4
The Communist government in Poland allowed the establishment
of an Ombudsman presumably without realizing that the office would
23provide an effective check on government power.   In fact, the
government hand-selected a female with no political affiliation or
226 See THE CONsTrrtrnON OF THE REPUBLiC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 211.
227 See id. at art. 209(2)-(3); see also Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220.
2 See Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220, at 207.
229 See id.
230 See id. at 207-08. The Polish Constitution allows the Ombudsman to bring an action
before the Constitutional Tribunal. See THE CONSITrUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND,
supra note 25, art. 191 (1) (1997).
231 See Amendments to the Ombudsman Act, POLISH NEws BuLL., Mar. 22, 2000,
available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Polish News File.
232 See iL
233 Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220, at 209.
234 See id.
235 See Letowska, Basic Rights, supra note 38, at 63.
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experience, believing it could control the new Ombudsman.236 The actual
result was unforeseeable, at least to the authorities.
The Polish public had a different view from that of the government
and enthusiastically supported the creation of the Ombudsman's office.2 37
In its first year, the office received more than 55,000 complaints. 238 A 1990
poll showed that the Ombudsman had the highest popularity of any Polish
politician.239 Ewa Letowska was also aware of the great public anticipation
regarding her function. Writing in 1990, Letowska noted how high early
Polish expectations were for the Ombudsman to effect change. She wrote
that "the [Ombudsman] is expected to effect substantial changes in the law
and the functioning of the State, as if he were superior to the authorities
which have been critici[z]ed." 240
The Polish Ombudsman has been unquestionably active.
Constitutional Court statistics reveal that, among all institutions that have
the authority to submit petitions, the Ombudsman has submitted the greatest
number of Constitutional Court petitions.241 In addition, the Ombudsman
conducts systematic inspections of prisons. The Ombudsman's
comprehensive report has played a part in reducing congestion and
providing a more humane prison system.242 By 1989 (one year after its
creation), the office of the Ombudsman had submitted nine cases to the
Constitutional Tribunal.243 Of seven completed cases (current at the time of
Letowska's writing), the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Ombudsman on five
occasions.244 Twenty-eight of the thirty-four extraordinary appeals filed by
the Ombudsman were also favorably resolved.245
The Ombudsman has argued against the formalistic attitude of the
Polish judiciary and urged courts to apply international human rights
standards. 6 In all human rights cases brought by the Ombudsman between
1989 and 1991, the Ombudsman invoked the Covenant on Civil and
236 See id.
237 See Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Poland - A Country Study (Glenn




240 Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220, at 209.
241 See Letowska, Basic Rights, supra note 38, at 64.
242 See Poland Study, supra note 237.
243 See Letowska, Polish Ombudsman, supra note 220, at 210.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See Letowska, Basic Rights, supra note 38, at 64.
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Political Rights and the European Convention.247 As mentioned above,
many of these cases were resolved favorably based on those conventions.
Human rights activist groups and the world community share the
optimism with respect to the function that the Ombudsman fulfills in
Poland. In 1999, the U.S. Department of State called the Ombudsman "an
effective, independent body with broad authority to investigate alleged
violations of civil rights and liberties."248 The State Department had made
similar statements in prior years.
249
Letowska's view is that "every Ombudsman who pr.erly performs
[his] duties serves as a check on government abuse...." Thus, even
popularly elected regimes may be disturbed by the careful oversight of an
Ombudsman.2 1 Although the shortsighted Polish Communist government
sought to control the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman ultimately was able to
exert influence over activities of the Polish government.252 This optimistic
view suggests that, even in a society where the Ombudsman's authority is
intentionally restricted, the Ombudsman may make significant contributions
to the protection of human rights.
At least one Polish criminal reform scholar identifies the institution
of the Ombudsman as a factor contributing to the success of human rights
protection in Poland. Jacek Kirczewski praises Letowska's office and
states that it was "the principal instrument for the implementation of various
rights."053  Nor has the office weakened since Letowska's departure.
Letowska's successor, Tadeusz Zielinski, developed a vastly popular civic
rights policy that increased the office's visibility and power.2 4 This year,
the Sejm selected a new Ombudsman, Andrzej Zoll, with an extensive
background in criminal law and legal reform.2 55
247 See id.
248 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 4.
249 See U.S. Department of State, Poland Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1997, Sec. 4 (visited Sept. 26, 1999) <www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/
1997_hrpjreport.html>.
250 Letowska, Basic Rights, supra note 38, at 63.
25' See id.
252 See id.
253 Jacek Kurczewski, The Politics of Human Rights in Post-Communist Poland, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 111, 132 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1995).
254 See id.
255 See Sejm Elects Zoll Ombudsman, POLISH PRESS AGENcY, June 8, 2000, available in
LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Polish News File, PAP News Wire. Zoll represented the
Solidarity trade union at the round table talks of 1989 and subsequently served as a
Constitutional Tribunal judge. See id.
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Poland adopted the Scandinavian model to form a very successful
256Ombudsman's office, thus creating a successful prototype from which
other nations could learn. Nonetheless, Letowska expressed the fear that
nations with repressive governments might not be able to draw on the
Polish experience. One reason for the Polish Ombudsman's success was the
element of surprise it contained for the government. The Polish
Ombudsman has demonstrated that such an office may pose a threat to
unlimited authority. 257 Letowska's concern is that transition governments,
informed by the Polish experience, may attempt to strip offices such as the
Ombudsman of many essential powers. 
58
It is important then to explore the adaptation of the Sachs and Kis
model to the successful Polish experience and identify reasons for Poland's
success in light of that framework. Several factors may have contributed to
Poland's success with the office of Ombudsman. First, as noted by
Letowska, it was the first such institution within the former Soviet bloc, and
the element of surprise may have kept the former government from
realizing the extent of the Ombudsman's potential power. Second, it was
widely supported by popular opinion and, in fact, public expectation
exceeded the power actually possessed by the Ombudsman.
In terms of the Sachs and Kis theories, the success of this
institution was predictable. The Ombudsman played a role in creating
Sachs' law-based state and paved the way for the impending transition to
capitalism and democracy. From the beginning, the office of the
Ombudsman did not exist in a vacuum. As noted by Sachs, Poland had the
advantage of unified opposition groups that eventually could provide a
check on the government during the transition period.2 59 These groups
would have welcomed the Ombudsman as another member of the anti-
governmental coalition. The Ombudsman was, in fact, more than a mere
member; it was a legally empowered instrument through which the
coalition could exert a check on government abuse.
The Ombudsman had the advantage of being the only member of
the opposition that possessed legal authority in 1988. Although the
Communist government might have hoped to limit the Ombudsman's
powers in practice, the fact remained that those powers existed in law. The
Ombudsman's legal foundation gave the position a firmer basis than the
government had foreseen and, more importantly, made it a more powerful
institution than the government was able to control. Thus, the alliance of
the Ombudsman with other opposition groups proved to be too strong for
256 See Letowska, Basic Rights, supra note 38, at 63.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 63-64.
259 The Ombudsman formed an alliance with Solidarity leaders and the Roman Catholic
church in fighting for human rights. See discussion supra Section I.A. 1.
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the Communist government, and it was forced to accept the realization in
practice of the powers it had nominally granted the Ombudsman.
The addition of the office of the Ombudsman to the numerous
groups forming part of the opposition coalition also gave rise to a situation
consistent with Kis' theory of coordinated transition. Before the creation of
the Ombudsman's office, the Communist government viewed itself as
strong enough to put down the opposition simply by the implementation of
several reforms a.2 6 The fact that the government allowed the creation of
that office demonstrates that it intended to pacify the population while
retaining effective control. Despite the government's intention, the
Ombudsman ultimately provided one legal mechanism through which the
opposition could operate. Soon after the Ombudsman joined the coalition,
the government recognized the strength of the opposition and determined
that a coordinated transition through cooperation with the opposition groups
was the only possibility available.
The creation of the office of the Ombudsman was not the only
factor contributing to the increased strength of the opposition in the 1988-
89 period. However, due to the office's enthusiastic reception by the public,
it must have increased popular mobilization. In addition, it was predictable
that the level of mobilization would rise only high enough to allow
coordinated transition. The Ombudsman was an instrument of legal
authority rather than force. With its powers limited primarily to criticism
rather than action, the Ombudsman could not spur the population of Poland
to revolution. Nonetheless, the fact that the Ombudsman's function existed
in law made that institution more credible and, as a result, lent credibility to
the entire opposition movement.
The office of the Ombudsman must, therefore, have increased
popular mobilization with respect to the reformist ideas of the Polish
opposition. Poland benefited from the fact that Solidarity, the Roman
Catholic church and other organizations had already implanted these
ideas. 261  The Ombudsman lent additional legitimacy to the concept of
260 In addition to the Ombudsman, these reforms included introducing capitalist elements
into the economy and the creation of the PRON. See discussion supra Section I.A.1, see
also note 56.
261 See discussion supra Section I.A.I. During the Solidarity movement of 1980-1981,
the Polish people protested against the repressive Communist government and insisted on
the adoption of western democratic institutions. See Brzezinski & Garlicki, Polish
Constitutional Law, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: THE VIEw FROM
WITHIN 21, 26 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephan III eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Brzezinski and Garlicki, Polish Constitutional Law]. Although the Solidarity movement
began as a labor movement, one of its goals was to overhaul the criminal justice system. In
addition to the labor strikes, a wave of prison protests occurred during 1980-1981. See
Holda, supra note 216, at 354-55. Although, in 1981, the Communist government imposed
martial law and cracked down on protesters, the ideology of the movement nonetheless led
to the implementation of reforms in the late 1980s, including the office of the Ombudsman.
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western democratization within the general population. The success of the
office was thus predictable based on its consistency with the previously
existing societal dynamic in Poland.
2. Supporting Factors in Polish Reform
This Section briefly discusses the role the Constitutional Tribunal
has played in the transition period in Poland, as well as the contribution of
international law to the Polish transition. 62  These elements will be
addressed in terms of how they interact with other factors in the reform
environment, including the scrutiny of Poland by international
organizations and groups. The focus here enhances appreciation of how
Polish reforms have functioned as a whole.
a. The Constitutional Tribunal
Other reforms played a supporting role in the success of the
Ombudsman. The Constitutional Tribunal, like the Ombudsman, has been
credited with helping to move Poland toward the ideal of a law-based state.
The Constitutional Tribunal's function is, however, complementary to that
of the Ombudsman and it is the effect of these institutions in conjunction
that contributes to the success of Polish reform.
Like the Ombudsman, the Constitutional Tribunal was created
under Communist rule, in 1985.63 Again, it was the first such institution in
the Soviet bloc and contrary to typical Communist practice.2 64 Unlike the
Ombudsman, the Constitutional Tribunal was encumbered with numerous
legal limitations that still curb its function.265 For example, the Tribunal
could not review many legislative acts (such as local ordinances), nor could
it apply international law to determine conformity of domestic
266legislation. Most importantly, if a Tribunal decision invalidated a
See Holda, supra note 216, at 357-58. The Constitutional Tribunal also sprang from the
demands of the Solidarity movement. See supra, Brzezinski & Garlicki, Polish
Constitutional Law, at 27.
262 The Tribunal and the role of international law as independent reform factors are
beyond the scope of this Note.
263 See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist
Poland: the Emergence of a Rechtstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13, 24 (1995) [hereinafter
Brzezinski & Garlicki, Judicial Review]. The Polish Constitution now provides for the
Tribunal's existence and jurisdiction over certain matters. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, art. 188.
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Parliamentary statute, the decision was not binding and Parliament had the
power to overrule it by a two-thirds majority vote.
Although they established important limits on executive
regulations, the Tribunal's early cases were politically unimportant. 268 The
Tribunal's function strengthened after the 1989 reforms.2 69 For one thing,
the Tribunal became an important vehicle for the Ombudsman (then
Letowska) in her attempt to change the system. Letowska and many
political theorists of the time opposed quick and radical changes; thus, they
used the Tribunal to gradually invalidate old Communist laws.270 Since the
1989 reforms also somewhat expanded the Tribunal's jurisdiction, it began
to address more controversial issues27' and to review issues involving
international law. 72 Although the Tribunal is still technically forbidden to
review Polish law for conformity with international law, the Tribunal has
273
used international law to expand and interpret Polish law. As mentioned
above, the Polish Ombudsman has frequently brought international law
issues and human rights conventions before the Tribunal.
The Constitutional Tribunal has further strengthened in function
during the past decade. In its recent jurisprudence, the Tribunal has
reasoned from unwritten constitutional provisions to establish a prohibition
against retroactive laws and a "protection of vested rights" principle 274 as
well as an equality principle.275 In addition, the Tribunal limited
Parliament's power to overrule its decisions by holding that if Parliament
failed to act within six months, the Tribunal decision automatically became
267 See id. at 26.
261 See id. at 28.
269 See id. at 31; see also discussion regarding Roundtable Talks, supra Section I.A.1.
270 See Brzezinski & Garlicki, Judicial Review, supra note 263, at 32.
271 See id. at 33.
272 See id. at 34.
273 See id.
274 Id. at 37. In a 1992 judgment, the Tribunal held that laws may not be retroactive,
unless the retroactivity is justified by another constitutional principle, such as social justice.
Although the Tribunal did not define the concept of social justice, it has since held several
statutes in violation of that principle. Id. (citing Judgment K15/91 of Jan. 29, 1992, 1992(I)
Orzecznictwo Tryb. Konst. 158 (Poland); Judgment P2/92 of June 1, 1993, 1993
Orzecznictwo Tryb. Konst. 217, 227 (Poland)).
275 For example, in 1993, the Tribunal found that an unemployment law provision
preventing an unemployed person from receiving benefits if a spouse received twice the
average national salary violated the principle of equality. See id. at 43 (citing Judgment
K7/92 of Apr. 6, 1993, 1993 Orzecznictwo Tryb. Konst. 75, 81-82 (Poland)). The Polish
Constitution does contain an equality principle. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLiC OF
POLAND supra note 25, at art. 32.
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binding.276 In October 1999, following a 2-year interim period after the
entry into force of the new Constitution, all Tribunal decisions became final
and binding. 7
Although the Tribunal has still been reluctant to take on important
political issues or to challenge institutions such as the Roman Catholic
Church, 8 it has established several principles important for the protection
of human rights and has also expanded its own authority to define such
principles.
The Constitutional Tribunal serves an important role in the
protection of human rights in Poland.279 Specifically, it is the power of the
Ombudsman to bring actions before the court that ensures protection, since
it is functionally equivalent to bringing a class action.280 In the years since
the fall of Communism, the Polish Tribunal has enhanced the ability of the
Polish Ombudsman to protect human rights.
b. International Law and Integrated Polish Reform
International standards have had some effect in facilitating Poland's
protection of human rights through the criminal justice system. When, in
November of 1992, Poland ratified the European Convention on Human
Rights, scholars viewed the ratification as a positive development since it
immediately introduced binding norms into the Polish legal system.28' In
addition, Poland's membership in the Council of Europe forces it to comply
with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2
276 See Brzezinski and Garlicki, Judicial Review, supra note 263, at 54 (citing Judgment
W6/93 of Oct. 20, 1993, 1993 Orzecznictwo Tryb. Konst. 495 (Poland)).
277 See 1999 Poland Report, supra note 23, at Sec. 1(e).
278 Cf. Brzezinski and Garlicki, Judicial Review, supra note 263, at 49 (stating that the
Tribunal ruled in favor of allowing religious instruction in schools without articulating any
rationale for its decision) (citing Judgment KI 1/90 of Jan. 30, 1991, 1991 Orzecznictwo
Tryb. Konst. 27 (Poland)).
279 See Kurczewski, supra note 253, at 132.
280 See id. Since the Ombudsman addresses problems of a general or systemic nature (see
discussion supra Section III.A.I., he protects the rights of citizens even in their absence.
Thus, his role may be analogized to that of one who brings a class action to protect the rights
of others. Here, the Ombudsman is not protecting any interest of his own but is fulfilling the
duties of his position.
281 See Brzezinski & Garlicki, Polish Constitutional Law, supra note 261, at 48. Other
Conventions cited that played a role in reforming Poland's penitentiary laws include the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. See Holda, supra note 216, at 364. The Polish Constitution provides that "[t]he
Republic of Poland respects international law binding upon it." THE CONSTITUTON OF THE
REPUBLIC OF POLAND, supra note 25, at art. 9.
282 See Holda, supra note 216, at 364.
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Membership in the Council is becoming increasingly important over time,
since it allows petitions against the Polish government to reach the Human
Rights Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.283
International standards also guide the drafters of Poland's criminal
legislation, as evidenced by the elimination of the death penalty from the
1997 code.2m By increasing protection for defendants' rights and requiring
judicial supervision of the parties, Poland strives to comply with
international standards.285
The fact that the nation is under permanent scrutiny contributes to
the development of a rule of law in Poland.286 Oversight by committees
such as the UN Committee on Human Rights also furthers this end, since
Poland must meet the standards of such committees in order to gain
acceptance and assistance from the international community.
2 87
No single Polish reform accounts entirely for the success of
Poland's transition relative to Russia. The office of the Ombudsman,
discussed in part (A)(1) of this Section, depends to a great extent on the
strength of other institutions. Specifically, the Ombudsman could not
function in the absence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, since the
Tribunal has often been the instrument wielded by the Ombudsman in
vindicating the rights of individuals. In addition, international conventions
and standards provide oversight to the system as a whole. Since
international instruments signed by Poland create enforceable domestic
norms,288 they provide support to both the Ombudsman and the
Constitutional Tribunal to justify a strong position on human rights
283 See Kurczewski, supra note 253, at 133.
2m "Punishments are: 1) fine, 2) restriction of liberty, 3) deprivation of liberty, 4)
deprivation of liberty for 25 years, 5) deprivation of liberty for life." KODEKS KARNY
(CRIMINAL CODE) art. 32 (Pol.), (unofficial translation by Polish Ministry of Justice, on file
with author). See also Tadeusz Bojarski, The Problems of Reform of Polish Criminal Law, 2
POLISH LEGAL J. 1, 14 (1997) (noting that the death penalty has not been executed in practice
since 1988.) It is noteworthy that the 1969 code abolished life imprisonment as inhumane
while allowing use of the death penalty. See Wasek & Frankowski, supra note 214, at 303;
cf New Penal Code Ends with Capital Punishment, PAP NEWSWIRE, Sept. 1, 1998, available
in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Poland News File (stating that the new code, while
not more lenient on criminals, allows more judicial discretion to impose adequate
punishment).
m Cf Wasek & Frankowski, supra note 214, at 304-305 (discussing the 1993 draft,
predecessor to the present code).
286 See Kurczewski, supra note 253, at 133.
287 Cf. Human Rights Reform by 2003, supra note 126 (recommending additional reforms
to combat problems of police brutality and long pre-trial delays).
288 The Polish Constitution cites international agreements as a binding source of law. See
THE CONSTITUTION OFTHEREPUBLICOFPOLAND, supra note 25, at art. 87(1).
20011
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
protection. The factors mentioned above thus reinforce each other and
contribute to the rule of law state that is required for a successful transition.
B. Russia
1. The Office of the Ombudsman
Russia, like other post-Soviet states, has little experience with
separation of powers, especially when the issue is oversight of the
centralized government. Traditionally, the Procuracy had responsibility for
receiving complaints about officials and overseeing human rights
protection. 89 The Soviet understanding of the office of Ombudsman was
that of an office only superficially independent and largely ineffective.290
However, between January 1994 and March 1995, Russia experimented
with the appointment of a powerful and active Ombudsman, human rights
activist Sergei Kovalev. 291 Kovalev's removal from office was followed by
a three-year vacancy in the position before, in 1998, a new Ombudsman
was appointed.
Demand for an Ombudsman arose in Russia after the success of the
institution in Poland (and later, other countries, including Lithuania and
Hungary).292 In November 1991, the Supreme Soviet adopted a non-
binding declaration providing for the creation of a "Parliamentary
Commissioner for Human Rights." 293 This provision was not incorporated
into the Russian Constitution.
Rather than immediately establishing the office of Ombudsman,
President Yeltsin created an executive commission, the President's
Commission on Human Rights.295 That body, whose membership included
numerous human rights activists, had the authority to examine human rights
289 See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at 1. See also discussion supra Section
I.B.2. Under the Russian Constitution, the modem Procuracy is a centralized structure
(closely linked to the federal government) in which lower Procurators are appointed by the
Procurator General. The Procurator General is appointed and dismissed by the President of
the Russian Federation. See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) art. 123
(1993).
290 See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at 1.
291 See id. at iii.
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296complaints and publish reports. Kovalev was appointed chair of the
Commission.
297
The 1993 Constitution officially established the office of
Ombudsman (to be appointed by the Duma) but did not define its powers
beyond stating that the Ombudsman must act "in accordance with a federal
constitutional law., 298  The Duma selected Kovalev as the new
Ombudsman, but did not immediately enact implementing legislation to
establish his position.299 Yeltsin thus issued a temporary decree under
which Kovalev could act while legislation was pending. °° Kovalev was
also to continue as head of the President's Commission. Thus, although
Kovalev held two positions in 1994, neither had a legal basis and both
depended on a presidential decree.
302
Immediately upon his appointment, Kovalev effectively protested
against human rights violations occurring during the 1993 state of
emergency.30 3  Scholars, who optimistically viewed the creation of the
position as a positive sign in Russia's transition, welcomed these
achievements .3 4 Kovalev did not, however, achieve success in his protests
against Yeltsin's Decree on Combating Organized Crime.305  Yeltsin
refused to rescind the decree, which allowed for the detainment of
individuals without charges for up to 30 days.
306
Conflict with the executive branch increased when Kovalev
published a 1994 human rights report criticizing the government for
beatings and abuse of detainees as well as other actions.30 7 Officials
attempted to suppress the report and tensions heightened.30 1 Kovalev's
strong opposition to the government's actions in Chechnya struck the final
blow in the eyes of the government.309 Kovalev argued against Russian
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 KONsT. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 5, art. 103 (1993).




303 See id. at 5.
304 See Bill Bowring, Human Rights in Russia: Discourse of Emancipation or Only a
Mirage?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 87, 109 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1995).
305 See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at 5.
306 See id.; see also discussion supra Section LB.2.
307 See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at 5.
303 See id at 5-6; see also PETER JUVILER, FREEDOM'S ORDEAL: THE STRUGGLE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN POsT-SOVIET STATES 127 (1998).
309 See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at 6.
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abuses in letters to Yeltsin and to the international community.310 Yeltsin
refused to act in response to Kovalev's complaints.311
By the beginning of 1995, Kovalev's outspokenness in revealing
atrocities in Chechnya had angered government officials.312 Kovalev had
already been the target of attacks by numerous officials, who accused him
of promoting unrest and inciting anti-government activities.3 3 In March,
the Duma removed him from office by vote. Seventy-five percent of the
Duma delegates voted in favor of removal.314
In March 1997, the Duma passed implementing legislation
establishing the position of human rights Ombudsman.31 5 It selected Duma
Deputy Oleg Mironov as Ombudsman in May 1998.316 Human rights
activists have widely criticized Mironov's appointment, since he is a former
member of the Communist party with no human rights expertise.1 7 Those
groups have viewed the appointment as part of a political deal-making
process involving other Duma committee posts.31 8 Activists also contrast
the current Commission with that which worked under Kovalev, stating that
the Commission now defends government policies rather than advocating
for human rights.319
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Mironov has taken at least
several small steps on behalf of human rights since his appointment. In
May 1998, almost immediately after taking office, Mironov submitted an
inquiry to the Procurator General regarding bribery and embezzlement in
the Procuracy. 32° The new Ombudsman requested documents detailing the
number of criminal proceedings filed against Procurators and the number of
310 See id. at 7.
311 See id. at 8.
312 See id. at 9.
313 See id.
314 See id. at iii. This percentage is calculated based on the total votes cast; 54% of the
entire Duma actually voted for removal.
315 See U.S. Department of State, Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1997, Sec. 4 (visited Sept. 26, 1999) <gopher://dostan.lib.uic.edu/> [hereinafter 1997
Russia Report].
316 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 4.; 1998 Russia Report, supra note 18,
at Sec. 4.
317 Mironov did, however, resign from the party and the Duma after the vote, since the




320 See New Human Rights Commissioner Asks Prosecutor General to Respond to Mass
Media Reports of Corruption among Prosecutors, MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, May 28,
1998, at 2, available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Russia News File.
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dismissals.32 ' In addition, Mironov gave a September speech urging Russia
to move forward with abolition of the death penalty.322- Russia must do so
in order to comply with the European Covenant of Human Rights and
Liberties, to which it is a signatory.323 Finally, in March 1999, Mironov
asked the Duma to implement legislation decreasing the allowable period of
pre-trial detention.3 24 The proposal, if adopted, would reduce the period to
six months for those convicted of common crimes and nine months for
those convicted of violent crimes.325 The U.S. Department of State notes
that Mironov is "working actively" to develop the Ombudsman's office and
to promote human rights.326 It is yet to be seen whether Mironov, acting
alone, can become as powerful a force as Poland's Letowska in protecting
human rights in Russia.327
In terms of the Sachs and Kis theories, the failure of the
Ombudsman's office in 1995 was as predictable as the success of the Polish
Ombudsman. Nominally, the Russian Ombudsman might have appeared
even more promising than his Polish counterpart. After all, Kovalev was a
strong human rights activist and a former political prisoner.328 Letowska
had no political experience and was hand-selected by the Soviet regime as
one who would be easily controlled. Furthermore, Kovalev was backed by
the entire Human Rights Commission, many members of which were also
activists.
The Russian institution was not firnly grounded in legal authority,
nor was it supported by the societal factors that existed in Poland even prior
to 1989. First, by 1994, the Russian government had observed the results of
the Ombudsman position in other former Communist states and may have
feared an Ombudsman with broad powers. The government had an interest
in keeping the Ombudsman in check at least until it could observe his
321 See id.
322 See Russia Must Abolish Provisions for Capital Punishment, ITRFAX RussIAN
NEws, Sept. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Russia News File.
'2' See id.
324 See Marina Shelkova, Russia Human Rights Guardian Calls for Pre-Trial Terms Cut,
ITAR-TASS NEws WIRE, Mar. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12589441.
321 See id.
326 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. 4. Mironov's office has grown to 150
employees and Mironov has spoken openly on issues such as socioeconomic rights, racism
and anti-semitism. See id.
327 Mironov's recent speeches indicate that he is frustrated by the lack of cooperation
between the presidential administration and the Ombudsman's office. Mironov claims that,
despite Mironov's desire to cooperate with the government, the administration continues to
block his attempts to meet with President Vladimir Putin. See Rights Leader Says Putin's
Administration Interferes, THE Moscow TIMEs, June 8, 2000, <http://www.moscowtimes.ru/
archives/issues/2000/Jun/08/Story5.html>.
328 See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at iii, n.2.
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actions. If necessary, it could reel the Ombudsman in and render him
ineffective.
Second, the Russian Ombudsman at the time of Kovalev's
appointment had no legal authority except that granted by the President.
Thus, its function was always tenuous since the office was subject to the
President's approval. Despite his designated powers, the Ombudsman had
no real power to check the other branches of government. As a result, the
office of the Ombudsman failed in practice to create Sachs' self-limiting
state.
In addition, the appointment of the Ombudsman in Russia did not
coincide with the other social conditions mentioned by Kis. Although
Communism had ended, it could not seriously be said that there was a split
in the legitimacy of the Russian Regime in 1994. In fact, at the time of
Kovalev's appointment, a state of emergency existed in order to suppress
Yeltsin's opponents. The Yeltsin faction was still strong enough to put
down any other opposition group.329
Thus, the office of the Ombudsman, even in combination with the
Human Rights Commission, was not strong enough to create credible
opposition to the Yeltsin government. There was no Solidarity movement
in Russia, nor was the church strong enough to ally with the Ombudsman.
Although Kovalev unquestionably mobilized the population,
330
mobilization did not rise to a level where the dominant party could not
contain it. Finally, Kovalev may have been unable to mobilize the
population to transition, since the idea of democratic transition was simply
not part of Russian culture.
331
By 1991, Russia's opposition groups had been extinguished by
centuries of czarist rule, followed by a repressive half-century under the
Soviet regime.332  Since the fall of Communism, these groups have
remained too weak to act in the face of rampant governmental abuses.333
Russia thus does not have a history of strong governmental opposition. In
addition, Russia's opposition groups have not negotiated with the
government to solve any legitimation crisis in recent memory.334  A
329 This might have been true even had a unified opposition existed, which it did not in
Russia. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
330 In December 1994, a survey conducted in Russia named Kovalev "Man of the Year."
A Russian legislator nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE,
supra note 36, at 6.
331 See supra note 212; see generally discussion supra Section I.A.2.
332 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 9; see also discussion supra Section I.A.2 (explaining that
repression prevents unity among opposition groups).
333 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 9; see also discussion supra Section I.A.2 (stating that
opposition groups had become marginalized by the 1990s).
334 See supra note 212.
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population cannot be quickly mobilized to support an idea it does not
understand.
As noted by the Human Rights Commission, Russia is a society in
which secrecy is a serious problem.335 The Russian government refused to
tolerate Kovalev not only because of his disagreement, but simply because
he revealed information to the public. Letowska was probably correct in
noting that any Ombudsman could provide a check on the government.
Even if Kovalev did little more than publicize abuses, he would have
fulfilled his function and provided some check on Russian authorities.
The Russian government removed Kovalev when his function of
oversight became inconvenient and unmanageable for Russian authorities.
Presumably, this could also have happened in Poland; it would be
surprising if Communist authorities had not wanted to remove Letowska
within a few months of her appointment. In Poland, however, the
government could not do so. Letowska's position had a legal basis, and
popular mobilization was simply too high for the government to act in
blatant disregard of the law.336
Kovalev's office, under the social conditions existing in 1994 and
under direct governmental control, was unable to serve as an effective
guardian of human rights. Section IV will address whether, under the Sachs
and Kis theories, any Ombudsman's office can successfully protect human
rights in Russia. Before exploring this question, this Note will address the
feasibility of jury trials in Russia in light of the Sachs and Kis framework.
2. Jury Trials
The lack of judicial independence is a basic Russian problem and
underlies Russia's inability to control abuses by the Procuracy. As
mentioned in earlier Sections, the dependence of courts on administrative
agencies such as the Procuracy dates to Soviet times.337 The USSR, partly
due to membership of judges and high officials in the Communist party, 378
never had an independent judiciary.3  Another factor that kept the
335 See JUVILER, supra note 308, at 150.
336 In fact, popular mobilization was too high for the government to continue in power
without cooperation with the opposition. This situation gave rise to the Roundtable Talks.
See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
337 Cf. Eugene Huskey, Russian Judicial Reform After Communism, in REFORMING
JUSTICE IN RussiA, 1864-1996 325, 326 (Peter H. Solomon, Jr. ed., 1997) (calling the Soviet-
era court "little more than an extension of executive power").
338 See Savitsky, supra note 34, at 120.
331 See id. at 119.
2001]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
judiciary crippled throughout Soviet rule was its tight financial ties to
political authorities.
340
Although Russia has undertaken some reforms to increase judicial
power, such as implementing life terms for judges341 and somewhat
restricting Procuracy power,34Z many scholars argue that the judiciary can
only be strengthened by divorcing it from the Procuracy. 343 Those scholars
argue that jury trials would equalize the balance between the prosecution
and defense in criminal trials and prevent the Procuracy from exercising its
influence over judges to obtain favorable results. 3" Jury trials may thus
promote the independence that the Russian judiciary so sadly lacks.
Judicial independence is not itself a goal, but a means that allows a
court to fulfill its essential functions, including the rendering of impartial
decisions.345 A reform that fosters judicial independence is successful only
if it also promotes essential goals of a criminal justice system governed by
the rule of law. This Section evaluates the introduction of jury trials in light
of how well juries prevent abuses and protect rights in the Russian criminal
system.
Remarkably, the jury trial is not an entirely new reform in Russia.
The judicial reforms of the nineteenth century gave czarist Russia limited
experience with jury trials.346 The juries of that period, although containing
a high percentage of illiterate peasants,347 were known for their democratic
and progressive character.348 Implementation of modern jury trials was
340 Cf. Huskey, supra note 337, at 332 (discussing reforms to decrease judicial financial
dependence).
341 See Savitsky, supra note 34, at 124; see also Huskey, supra note 337, at 336. Only
about twenty percent of Russian judges had received lifetime appointments in 1998. See
Boylan, supra note 37, at 1333.
342 A 1991 law prohibits the Procuracy from directly supervising the courts but preserves
primary procuratorial responsibility for reviewing citizen complaints. See Gordon B. Smith,
The Struggle Over the Procuracy, in REFORMING JUSTICE IN RUsSIA, 1864-1996 348, 356-57
(Peter H. Solomon, Jr. ed., 1997).
34' See id. at 359-60. This is one argument for limiting the Procuracy to purely
prosecutorial functions.
344 See Huskey, supra note 337, at 334; see also Boylan, supra note 37, at 1343-44
(arguing that the jury trial is a major step that Western and Russian reformers must
encourage).
345 See Savitsky, supra note 34, at 130-131.
346 See Alexander K. Afanas'ev, Jurors and Jury Trials in Imperial Russia, 1866-1885, in
RussIA's GREAT REFORMS, 1855-1881 214, 214 (Ben Eklof et al. eds., 1994) (Indiana-
Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies, Alexander Rabinowitch & William
G. Rosenberg eds.).
347 See id. at 222.
348 See id. at 228.
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based on a desire to recapture this period, and drafters of the modem reform
project deliberately used the nineteenth-century jury laws as a
framework. 49
A study of jury trials in Russia requires an understanding of the
nature of the proceedings. The current Russian judicial system is based on
European continental civil law, with an overlay of Soviet law. Thus,
unlike common law systems, the Russian system is inquisitorial rather than
adversarial in nature. In a traditional Russian trial, the judge plays the
dual roles of questioner and fact-finder.352 Although advocates may also
pose questions, the role of advocates is much more limited in an
inquisitorial system.353
Thus, a jury trial in Russia, although otherwise resembling an
adversarial jury trial, has necessary differences based on the inquisitorial
nature of the proceeding. Since the Procuracy has virtually complete
responsibility for developing evidence during pretrial investigation, the
defense attorney's participation in the presentation of evidence is limited.354
The jury trial itself makes proceedings more adversarial by equalizing the
status of the parties and by emphasizing closing arguments more than
would occur in a bench trial. 5 In addition, the fact that the judge no longer
plays dual roles strengthens the defense position considerably.
The Russian jury system, as it presently exists, is somewhat of an
anomaly in the degree of discretion it gives to jurors. Jurors reach a
specific verdict on a number of questions and then answer an additional
question regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.356 Thus, in
theory, a jury can find all elements of a crime satisfied and yet "nullify" its
own verdict by finding the defendant innocent.357 Jurors may also find that
a defendant deserves leniency, which requires a judge to reduce the
defendant's sentence. 8
349 See Sarah J. Reynolds, Jury Trials in Modem Russia, in REFORMING JUSTICE IN
RussIA, 1864-1996 374, 375 (Peter H. Solomon, Jr. ed., 1997).
350 See Boylan, supra note 37, at 1330.
351 See id.
352 This function is increased when, as in 60% of criminal cases, the Procurator fails to
appear. See Shakirov, supra note 149.
353 See Boylan, supra note 37, at 1330.
354 See id.
355 See id.
356 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 380.
357 See id.
358 Where a jury has requested leniency, the punishment for the defendant may not exceed
two-thirds of the maximum penalty for the offense. See CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RussIAN
FEDERATION, ch. 10, art. 65(1) (1996), translated in CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RussIAN
FEDERATION (William E. Butler ed., trans., 2d ed. 1998); see also id. at 381.
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Jury trials were reintroduced in Russia in 1991359 on an
experimental basis in nine regions.360 The 1993 Constitution provided the
right to a Jury trial and required Parliament to pass implementing
legislation. Parliament did not do so and, as of 1996, only a few
additional regions had adopted jury trials.362 Even in those regions, jury
trials are limited to defendants on trial for the most serious crimes. 363
Thousands of defendants are thus denied in practice a right that exists in the
Russian Constitution.
364
Critics of the jury system cite several bases for their position,
including the seriously overtaxed Russian budget.365 In the nine regions
where jury trials have been implemented, jurors are paid relatively
generously for their time and expenses.366 Presumably, this reduces jurors'
susceptibility to corruption, but it is also one of the most significant costs of
trying a case.3 67  The cost to local courts for jurors' salaries alone is
equivalent to paying seven judges for each day of trial. 368 The difficulty of
financing this type of system probably accounts for the fact that jury trials
have not spread beyond the original experimental regions.369
In addition, there is inherent distrust for the jury system, especially
among government officials.370 Many fear that a jury system is more likely
to release dangerous criminals into the streets. The current Duma supports
measures it perceives as tough on crime, and is thus reluctant to approve a
measure that would result in more acquittals. 371 Finally, some critics have
359 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 376.
360 See Boylan, supra note 37, at 1337.
361 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) See. 1., ch. 2, art. 47(2)
(1993); see also id.
362 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 384. A plan to extend jury trials to twelve additional
regions in 1999 failed due to lack of funds. See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec.
l(e).
363 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 388.
364 The denial of this right to some members of the Russian population may also violate
the Equal Protection clause of the Russian Constitution. See Boylan, supra note 37, at 1341.
365 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 388.
366 Jurors are compensated at a rate of one-half of the judge's daily pay. See id. at 383.
367 See id. at 387.
368 See id.
369 See id.
370 See Boylan, supra note 37, at 1338.
371 See Melissa Akin, 3 Men Appeal for Trial by Jury, Moscow TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Russia News File.
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stated that jury trials would lengthen proceedings and increase the
possibility of bias by "non-professional" jurors.372
Proponents, on the other hand, argue that jury trials would not only
strengthen the judiciary and equalize the balance between the parties in a
criminal trial but would have several other positive effects as well. Jury
trials might shift the focus from that of a totalitarian state hostile to the
individual 373 to once again involving the public in the process of justice.374
Thus, a jury system might inject a "democratic conscience" into the
criminal system. 75
Jury trial proponents acknowledge that the jury system depends on
acceptance and enthusiasm by the public to function effectively. -? 76 It is
unclear what the actual efficacy of jury trials has been thus far. For
example, the drafters granted jurors great discretion to "nullify" verdicts or
request leniency in order to allow jurors to "send a message" that a law or
punishment was unduly harsh.377 In practice, however, these powers have
been used rarely. As of 1996, there had been no reported instances of jury
nullifications. 378 Leniency requests also did not occur in the majority of
cases. 379 Individuals asked to serve as jurors have reported a high rate of
satisfaction with the system, although the high rate of pay may at least
partially account for this reaction.SO
Conviction rates in jury trials have proven to be much lower than
those in traditional Procuracy-dominated trials.381 Nonetheless, few
defendants request jury trials, which may reflect either a belief that jury
trials are equally repressive382 or simply a lack of awareness that jury trials
are available.
372 See Smith, supra note 342, at 361.
373 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 377.
'74 See id. at 378.
375 Cf. id. at 379 (stating that, under the czarist system, the jury was considered the
"democratic conscience").
376 See id.
37 See id. at 381.
378 See id. at 385.
379 See id.
310 See id. at 387.
381 Acquittal rates in traditional trials are between 0.5 and 1 percent. See Aldn, supra note
371. In 1997, juries acquitted 22% of defendants. See <http://www.rusmysl.ru/
1991/4255/425518.html> (visited Feb. 27, 2000). According to the U. S. Department of
State, the percentage of acquittals was 21.3% in 1999. See 1999 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1(e).
382 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 388.
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Certainly there are many ways in which juries might protect the
rights of defendants better than the traditional Russian court. For example,
juries would acquit a defendant where evidence did not support guilt,
instead of sending the case back to the Procuracy for additional
investigation. In addition, juries would presumably represent average
Russians, often hostile to the Procuracy, rather than high officials with
possible ties to that institution. Although this might inject a degree of bias
in favor of the defendant into the proceedings, it can be argued that the
repressive nature of the former system requires this type of strong
counterweight.
Jury trials could not directly protect defendants from pretrial
abuses. There are, however, at least two indirect ways in which juries
might check this behavior. First, by reducing the power of the Procuracy
and strengthening the court's power for judicial review, juries might allow
the courts to better supervise Procuracy misconduct. Second, juries could
independently police the Procuracy by throwing out cases where evidence
was illegally obtained or insufficient. This would provide an incentive to
the Procuracy to observe human rights in its investigations, at least where
its misconduct could be discovered.
Jury trials have some potential to aid in the protection of human
rights. However, this is true only if the underlying theory of reform takes
hold successfully in the population. The question is whether Russia can
create economic and social conditions in which jury trials will succeed.
This paper argues that Russia cannot achieve these conditions in the near
future. Section IV will further address this problem.
3. Supporting Factors in Russian Reform
This Section will briefly discuss the role of the Russian
Constitutional Court and international standards in Russian reform. As in
Section llI(A)(2) above, the focus is not on these developments as
independent reforms, but on their effect on the transition environment as a
whole.
a. The Constitutional Court
Scholars have viewed the Russian Constitutional Court, established
in 1991, as effective to some degree.383 The law creating the Court grantedit broad powers to declare acts unconstitutional or to require the institutions
383 Cf Savitsky, supra note 34, at 132 (arguing that the Court took a dominant position in
its first few years of existence).
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creating the acts to modify them.384  The Court's duties include
constitutional supervision of Parliament, the President and executive
385agencies. The Court may also prevent the ratification of treaties it finds
unconstitutional.386 In addition, an individual may file a petition with the
Court after exhausting other domestic remedies.3 7 The Court's decision,
based on individual petition, that a law deviates from the Constitution again
requires the agency responsible to modify the law in question.388
The Russian Constitutional Court thus creates a legal foundation
for separation of powers. 389  The government has already bolstered the
Court's legitimacy by recognizing members' life tenure and not attempting
to remove Court members. 390  Questions still remain as to whether the
Court will be able to provide a check on the executive and legislative
branches when it really counts. The new Constitution allows the president
alone to issue binding decrees (although those decrees are still subject to the
Constitution).39' In addition, the fact that the Duma and the President have
been able to successfully work together in the past suggests that these
institutions together might be able to overpower the Court in a conflict.392
The Russian Constitution provides that universally accepted human
rights norms take precedence over domestic law and have direct effect in
Russia.393 In its first few years of existence, the Constitutional Court found
384 The Russian Constitution now provides for the existence of the court and defines its
jurisdiction. See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 7, art. 125
(1993); see also id.
385 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 7, art. 125 (1993);
see also F. J. M. FELDBRUGGE, RUSSIAN LAW 45 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE 184 (F.J.M
Feldbrugge ed., 1993).
386 See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1., ch. 7, art. 125 (1993);
see also FELDBRUGGE, supra note 385, at 186.
387 Individuals have the right of appeal to domestic courts and to international bodies after
exhaustion of domestic remedies. See KONST. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation)
Sec. 1, ch. 2, art. 46 (1993); see also Savitsky, supra note 34, at 133.
388 See Savitsky, supra note 34, at 133.
389 It is unclear how separate the court will be from the executive branch in practice. One
potential problem is that the law creating the court also gave life tenure to all its members,
some of whom were nominated by hard-line Communist organizations. See Rein Mullerson,
Perspectives on Human Rights and Democracy in the Former Soviet Republics, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 47, 67 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1995).
390 See Bowring, supra note 304, at 106.
391 See KONsT. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1, ch. 7, art. 90 (1993);
see also id.
392 See Bowring, supra note 304, at 106.
393 "The universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties and
agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an
international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those
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violations not only of the Russian Constitution but of international human
rights norms as well. 394 In a 1992 case, the Court applied the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, as well as several
International Labour Organisation instruments.
395
Thus, although the Russian Constitutional Court lacks the support
that an Ombudsman might provide (and has provided in Poland), it has
shown a desire to play a role in enforcing human rights norms in Russia.
The difficulty is the current weakness of the Court acting alone, since it
cannot choose its controversies. The Court's attempts to apply binding
international law norms in Russia indicate that the Russian Constitutional
Court might benefit from cooperation with an Ombudsman, who could
bring Russian human rights issues before the Court. The Court might thus
have the opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to move toward greater
human rights protection in Russia.
b. International Law and Integrated Russian Reform
The binding status of international human rights norms in the
Russian Constitution allows a brief analysis of the extent to which
international law and international human rights groups have furthered the
protection of human rights in Russia. Russia has joined the Council of
Europe and is a party to several international human rights instruments,
including the European Covenant of Human Rights.396 Russia is still in the
process of fully implementing these norms since, although the Russian
Constitution is consistent with instruments like the European Convention,
some provisions of Russian legislation still conflict with those
documents. 397 Russia has at least attempted to draft federal legislation that
would spell out human rights standards in domestic law.3
98
Russia does have a large number of non-governmental
organizations, whose work focuses on various issues of economic and
envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied." See KONST. RF
(Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1, ch. 1, art. 15(4) (1993); see also id. at 104.
394 See Savitsky, supra note 34, at 134; see also Bowring, supra note 304, at 104.
395 See Bowring, supra note 304, at 104.
396 See Igor Vandenko, Human Rights in Russia Will Be Protected in Accordance With
European Standards, NoviYE IZVESTIA, Feb. 21, 1998, at 2, available in LEXIS, Country &
Region Library, Russia News File.
397 For example, the Russian police law still permits the use of physical force to stop
administrative offenses. In addition, the use of jury trials in only nine regions may violate a
provision granting equal protection. See id.
398 See Creating a Legislative Basis for Human Rights Is Goal of New Federal Program,
IZVESTIA, Mar. 13, 1998, at 3, translated in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Russia News
File.
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social rights.399 Many of these organizations are chronically short of
funds4°0 and operate with budgets made up primarily of money from foreign
grants.4 I Although such constraints no doubt face NGOs in Poland and
many other nations, they have proven to be only one of a series of obstacles
facing Russian NGOs.
These organizations complain that, although they want to cooperate
with government officials to ensure human rights protection, the
government is not willing to engage in dialogue with human rights
groups.4° 2 Although a presidential decree now recommends that regional
leaders organize human rights commissions analogous to the presidential
commission, the decree still does not promise any dialogue between
authorities and organizations representing the Russian people. °3 Thus,
Russia may not yet be on the path to Kis' coordinated transition, since it is
only through dialogue and negotiation between opposition and the
government that such transition can occur.
To some extent, Russia has demonstrated an increasing desire to
comply with international human rights standards. The adoption of
international conventions that inject binding norms into Russian law
supports that proposition. Nonetheless, progress has been slow and Russia
does not yet protect human rights in a manner acceptable to the
international community. Section IV will analyze the question of whether
the current reforms will be, over time, sufficient to push Russia into
compliance. In addition, it will address what further actions can be taken,
in light of the Sachs and Kis transition theories.
IV. NEW APPROACHES TO REFORM IN RussiA
Poland and Russia, although once under the same central
Communist authority, have taken very different transition paths, despite
experiments with similar reforms. This Section will apply the Sachs and
Kis framework to identify critical lessons derived from the Polish and
Russian transition experiences. It will evaluate the relationship between
societal factors and the success of reform.
Finally, this Section will draw on the Polish experience to articulate
the reforms that might be most successful in protecting human rights in
Russia. It will argue that an Ombudsman with a legal basis of power is an
institution that might be adapted to achieve some measure of success in
399 See JUVILER, supra note 308, at 170.
4w See id. at 181.
40' See id. at 183.
402 See Ludmila Alexeeva, The Intermediaries Between Power and Society, IZVESTIA,
October 16, 1997, at 5, available in LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Russia News File.
403 See id.
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Russia. The jury trial experiment, on the other hand, might have been
unrealistic given the government's inability to fully implement that system
legally or financially. In addition, the Polish experience may demonstrate
that the jury trial is unnecessary, and that Russia should divert its resources
toward less costly reforms.
A. The Office of the Ombudsman
Although Russia and Poland both experimented with an
Ombudsman's office early in the reform period, the two nations had very
different experiences with the institution. Both offices were created under
Communist regimes; yet, Letowska's office was able to gain power and
provide an effective check on the government, while Kovalev failed to do
so and was removed from office by the government. There are several
reasons for the varying results.
First, the Polish Ombudsman was the first such institution in the
former Soviet bloc. The Ombudsman thus had the advantage of surprise,
since the government was unaware that the Ombudsman might effectively
check government function. Second, Poland benefited from a coalition of
numerous opposition groups, which existed prior to the formation of the
Ombudsman's office. These groups provided support to the Ombudsman in
its efforts to check government abuse. Finally, the Polish Ombudsman,
unlike the Russian Ombudsman, possessed legal authority. This rendered
the position more credible and, given the high popular mobilization in
Poland, made the Ombudsman impossible to remove.
The question is whether, given societal conditions, Russia may
fashion any Ombudsman's office that effectively safeguards human rights.
This Note argues that the achievement of such an institution is possible and
that Russia has taken several small first steps toward protecting human
rights by recently electing its new Ombudsman.
In 1998, Russia finally completed all the steps necessary to place its
new Ombudsman, Oleg Mironov, in office. The process took a full three
years after the removal of Sergei Kovalev. Although Mironov has no
human rights experience, his position has an advantage over that of
Kovalev in that it exists absent a special decree from Yeltsin.
Nonetheless, legality is neither the only nor the primary factor
determining the success of a particular reform in a transition country. As
the Sachs and Kis theories explain, countries are driven toward peaceful
transitions where a repressive government faces strong, credible opposition.
Opposition groups mobilize the population and force cooperation between
the two regimes. In addition, the existence of strong opposition checks the
ruling authority throughout the transition period. The threat of the
opposition protects against abuses and excesses.
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Thus, the legality of Mironov's position is important only to the
extent that it lends credibility and strength to a coalition of human rights
opposition groups. It clearly serves these purposes, at least to some degree.
The fact that the Ombudsman's position has a legislative basis makes
Mironov both more credible and more difficult to remove.
It was not a difficult task for Yeltsin's Duma to remove Kovalev in
1995. In fact, Yeltsin could have removed him without submitting the issue
to the Duma, since Kovalev's position was dependent on authority given by
the executive branch. Presumably, if Yeltsin had not had Duma support, he
would have removed Kovalev in this manner.
On the other hand, if the executive branch desired to remove
Mironov or a later Ombudsman, it would need support from the Duma.
404
The Duma could remove the Ombudsman (for a reason specified in the
original legislation) or repeal the old law. If the Duma refused to do this,
the executive would act in violation of the law by removing the
Ombudsman. Such a violation would raise at least some protest from
NGOs and other human rights activist groups.
Mironov possesses another advantage over Sergei Kovalev: he took
office four years later. In the interim, human rights groups have
proliferated and strengthened in Russia. It thus appears that Mironov can
align himself with a coalition that is somewhat stronger than the relatively
young groups that backed Kovalev in 1994. Kovalev, of course, had a
governmental human rights commission made up of strong activists. The
problem was that the commission was governmental and under Yeltsin's
direct control. An Ombudsman can be more successful if, as in Poland, he
can align himself with the population against the government.
Mironov's current position, furthermore, seems to parallel that of
Ewa Letowska in 1989. Letowska, like Mironov, had no political
experience. Nonetheless, her power to oversee human rights was founded
in legislation. It is promising to note that Mironov has taken office in the
same legal situation as Poland's Letowska. Mironov's Communist ties,
however, may undercut his function by rendering him more subject to
governmental influence than was Letowska. Letowska, however, was also
selected specifically to serve as a puppet of the Communist party.
Letowska's optimistic view is that any Ombudsman who properly
performs his functions can be an effective check on the government.
Kovalev provided that type of check during the brief life of his office.
Mironov's actions, as well, seem to indicate that he intends to take his
404 The 1995 draft law on the Ombudsman provided for the election of the Ombudsman
by the Duma for a five-year term. Removal of the Ombudsman would require a majority of
the Duma members. Unfortunately, the listed grounds on which the Ombudsman could be
removed were vaguely stated. See PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 36, at 12. The draft
law on the Ombudsman was enacted into law in March 1997. See 1997 Russia Report,
supra note 315, at See. 4.
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responsibilities seriously. In the area of criminal procedure, Mironov has
taken several important steps, including investigating corruption in the
Procuracy and advocating shorter periods of pre-trial detention.
It is true that an Ombudsman acting alone can be only minimally
effective. The movement of the Russian Constitutional Court toward
applying international human rights norms is consistent with the actions of
the Polish Tribunal. That movement is promising and suggests that the
Russian Constitutional Court might enhance Mironov's position. The
power to bring actions is central to the function of an Ombudsman, and it is
doubtful whether Letowska could have been as effective without a Court
willing to apply international conventions.
Still, the ultimate success of an Ombudsman depends on the extent
to which he can align himself with a credible coalition of opposition.
Although such a coalition does not truly exist in Russia today, the increased
activity of NGOs and human rights groups suggests that, at the least, ideas
of democratic change have begun to take hold in the popular consciousness
of Russia. In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church continues to gain
strength. Although these groups have not mobilized Russia the way the
Roman Catholic church and the Solidarity movement mobilized Poland, it
is likely that, over time, popular mobilization will continue to grow. If the
Ombudsman remains a part of Russian society, it will participate in and
contribute to the change in popular attitude. The international community
should encourage the development of human rights activist groups and
changes in the public consciousness, while recognizing that a strong
opposition coalition will take years to develop in Russia.
Of course, much depends on political events. Russia still has only
the seeds of a popular human rights movement; a controversial leader could
fragment and destroy the opposition coalition. If, however, Russia
continues its slow progress toward human rights awareness, the
Ombudsman could contribute positively to that process.
B. Jury Trials
Like the office of the Ombudsman, the jury trial is a reform that
might, over time, have the result of shifting the popular consciousness.
There are several ways in which the jury trial could do so and, in the
process, end the Procuracy's complete control over the criminal justice
system. Jury trials might serve a useful purpose in Russia at some point in
the future. However, given financial and societal factors, jury trials are
inappropriate in Russia at the present time.
First, the financial obstacles to implementing jury trials in all of
Russia are enormous. Russian courts are so strained that they cannot pay
for basic expenses. Although the Russian Constitution provides that only
the federal government should finance the courts, budget cuts over the last
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few years have placed many courts in dire straits.40 5 About half of all
courts are receiving financial aid from local governments and, despite such
aid, many courts cannot even pay electricity and telephone bills. 4  It is
difficult to contemplate a more expensive reform than the 1991 jury
experiment.
As discussed in Section I1, one of the largest expenses is paying
the salary of the jurors. Generous compensation (currently equal to one-
half the daily salary of a judge)4°7 is necessary both to ensure that jurors
will appear and to reduce susceptibility to bribery. However, the large
expense is likely the reason that few regions beyond the original nine have
adopted jury trials.
Financial constraints are an insufficient reason to completely reject
a reform that has the potential to work effectively. Presumably the current
experiment could be modified to make it more economically feasible.
Nonetheless, the financial reality of Russia suggests that not all regions can
undertake the reform at this time. Furthermore, implementing jury trials in
only a portion of Russia seems to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Russian Constitution.40 8
This argument assumes that in implementing reforms with the goal
of achieving a law-based state, reformers should attempt to comply with
law. Section IV(A), above, mentions several reasons for ensuring the
legality of reforms. Among these reasons are the need for instilling a sense
of legitimacy in the population and the increased permanence that reforms
gain when founded on a legal basis. Thus, Russian jury trials should be put
off until all regions are financially able to undertake the reforms.40 9
In addition, juries might be unable to have any real impact on
human rights violations. Pretrial abuses would be beyond the jury's direct
control. It can be argued that juries strengthen the judiciary and allow more
stringent review, or that juries can throw out cases where evidence has been
illegally obtained. It is the judge, however, who would be directly
responsible for either of these effects. A strong judiciary that is unwilling
405 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. l(e); 1998 Russia Report, supra note
18, at Sec. 1(e).
406 See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18, at Sec. l(e).
407 See Reynolds, supra note 349, at 387.
408 "Every citizen of the Russian Federation shall enjoy in its territory all the rights and
freedoms and bear equal duties provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation."
KoNsT. RF (Constitution of the Russian Federation) Sec. 1, ch. 1, art. 6(3) (1993).
409 The author recognizes that postponing jury trials still would result in violation of Sec.
1, Ch. 2, Art. 47(2), of the Russian Constitution, which provides the right to a jury trial.
However, current Russian reality demonstrates that the equal protection clause and the jury
trial provision are necessarily inconsistent at this time. The Russian government must
choose between these provisions and should elect to repeal the jury trial provision, since
Russia is fundamentally unable to comply with such a provision.
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to police the Procuracy cannot contribute to human rights reform. The
judge, even under the current system, presumably has discretion to throw
out a case on insufficient or illegally obtained evidence. If the judge fails to
do so, juries still have the option of simply acquitting the defendant. This
assumes that juries understand the importance of procedural safeguards,
which may be a questionable proposition in Russia.
More important are the societal factors that underlie a reform and
allow it to function effectively. A reform such as the introduction of jury
trials relies on the presence of certain concepts in the popular
consciousness. For several reasons, Russia has not developed a popular
consciousness that would allow jury trials to work effectively.
First, Russia's tradition does not support the concept of a state ruled
by law. 410  Even if it did, it would not support the notion of public
participation in enforcing the law. Russia's regime has been totalitarian in
nature for seventy years. Although Russia did have jury trials during the
czarist period,41' there are few that could remember or revive the ideas of
that period. This means that the idea of negotiated transition is not present
in the Russian popular culture, and must be invented from scratch before
change can be effected in Russia.
Russian juries thus might be unprepared for their responsibilities.
Since citizens have had so little participation in criminal law, they are likely
to be unfamiliar with concepts of guilt and burdens of proof. It will be
difficult for juries to understand these concepts even when explained by the
judge. In a nation that has not been ruled by law, juries are much less likely
to appreciate the significance of law and conform their decisions to legal
principles. In the most obvious scenario, jurors might be vulnerable to
outside influences.
The popular consciousness that has developed over the Communist
and post-Communist period is likely to lend certain elements to the
decision-making process of a Russian jury. Fear is an element that may
produce varying effects. For example, general fears of the rising crime rate
and demands for justice may lead a jury to convict on insufficient evidence.
Such an outcome is quite likely in a nation that has continually maintained
a repressive penal attitude. On the other hand, fear of crime must be
balanced against distrust of government agencies and the likelihood of
acquittal based merely on anger at the government. Finally, specific fear
for the well-being and safety of one's family and friends also exists in
Russia, and it is likely that Russian juries will not convict a defendant that
they believe has powerful and dangerous connections. It is not clear that
these dangers will be reduced or eliminated by maintaining the present
410 This means, in terms of the Sachs and Kis theories, that Russia does not have the
concept of a law-based state present in the popular consciousness. See discussion supra
Section II.B.
411 See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
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system of trial by judge. Still, it may be quicker and easier to educate
judges to the concept of rule of law than the general population. It will
certainly be less expensive.
Although Poland has not yet implemented jury trials and shows no
sign of doing so, it could be argued that this reform would have a greater
potential for success in Poland. Unlike Russia, Poland's notions of
democracy and public participation in law were not completely suppressed
throughout the Communist period.412 The fact that a Solidarity movement
could emerge and demand a voice in the system demonstrates this.
As Sachs and Kis point out, the fact that the concept of a transition
governed by law existed in the Polish consciousness meant that Poland did
not have to invent these notions from scratch. Poland could have relied on
a citizenry that welcomed the chance to shape the rule of law to support the
introduction of jury trials. The fact is that Poland did not implement jury
trials. It is true that Poland had no prior model to draw on and that Russia's
previous experience with jury trials presumably made that proposal more
attractive. Nonetheless, Poland probably had more resources than Russia
and social conditions more appropriate to jury trials. Despite these factors,
Poland undertook a reform program without jury trials.
The absence of jury trials does not appear to have crippled Poland's
transition. As discussed in earlier Sections, Polish judges render justice
independently and without illegal influence. Although Poland still has long
periods of pretrial detention, judges review detention orders and enforce
time limits. In addition, torture does not occur and confessions are not
coerced during pretrial detention.
The fact that Poland can protect basic human rights in the absence
of jury trials suggests that Russia might better divert its resources toward
reforms that would be less costly and more effective. Funds might be better
used to implement reform within the judiciary itself; for example, those
funds could provide education to ensure that judges are capable of applying
rules of law. 4 3 The Russian judiciary could also benefit from restructuring
to reduce its political and financial dependence on the executive branch.
Jury trials are unquestionably one mechanism for bringing the
public into close involvement with the law, and this is a desirable effect. If,
however, jury trials are implemented in the hopes of cultivating notions of
law in the popular consciousness, the reform seems to be premature. Jury
trials rely on a population which already understands the rule of law, and in
which notions do not have to be invented. Once those concepts are in
412 See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
413 In October 1999, then-Prime Minister Putin signed a decree establishing the Academy
of Justice, Russia's first judicial training institution. See 1999 Russia Report, supra note 18,
at Sec. 1(e).
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place, jury trials may serve a very positive function in Russian criminal law.
For the present, there are more efficient ways to educate the population.
V. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
The Sachs and Kis framework suggests that Russia has many
battles yet to fight. Societal, more than legal, conditions have impeded
Russia thus far in completing its transition and protecting human rights at a
level acceptable to the world community. Poland, galvanized by its strong
non-governmental groups, has advanced farther. This comparison
illuminates steps the international community can take to encourage the
reform process in both countries.
Joining international conventions and applying international
standards in domestic law are small but positive steps for Poland and
Russia. Other nations should encourage progress by overseeing human
rights and ensuring increased compliance with conventions over time. The
activity of foreign human rights organizations, especially in Russia, should
continue. The international community is an external force that, in
collaboration with local groups, may exert a positive influence over the
government. International organizations should also be willing to assist
local groups when necessary, to facilitate communication with the
government and to develop strategies for improving human rights
protection. The international community can thus promote the development
of internal checks on government abuse and encourage the growth of civic
society.
Throughout the process, societal factors should be emphasized and
reform programs should be tailored to build on concepts already present in
society. Social factors, rather than the structure of institutions, determine
the success or failure of transitions. The Sachs and Kis theories provide
more than a mere justification for predictions about the success or failure of
transitions. Such a function would not be useful, since it would simply
force a conclusion about the likelihood of implementing a reform program
effectively. Instead, the theories provide a context in which to place
proposed reforms to evaluate the potential of each reform individually. By
examining each reform within its societal framework, we view the broader
range of factors that will actually affect the reform's success. Reforms that
build on conditions already present in society will be successful, while
those that make false assumptions about a society's capabilities will not.
The Sachs and Kis framework reminds us not to hastily transfer a reform
from one society to another without an analysis of societal factors.
These observations are pertinent not only to reforms in Poland and
Russia, but to reform programs occurring in the proliferation of new
republics in our modem world. We live in an era of emerging and
[Vol. 33:13
2001] HUMAN RIGHTS IN TRANSITION 69
reemerging nations, as well as an era of transition and reform. It is
tempting and often instructive to draw on the experiences of other nations.
The comparison of reforms in Russia and Poland demonstrates that reforms
that are carefully adapted to the social climate are more likely to be
effective. This experience provides a useful context for evaluating the
success and failure of reform.

